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SEPTEMBER 11TH AND THE SINGLE EUROPEAN SKY:
DEVELOPING CONCEPTS OF AIRSPACE SOVEREIGNTY
MAJOR STEPHEN M. SHREWSBURY'
I hope that you will not dally with the thought of creating great
blocks of closed air, thereby tracing in the sky the conditions of
possible future wars. I know you will see to it that the air, which
God gave to everyone, shall not become the means of domina-
tion over anyone. 2
I. INTRODUCTION
T HE TRADITIONAL concept of sovereignty, the power of
states to regulate their internal affairs without foreign inter-
ference, has been evolving for centuries. Change has been ex-
tremely slow at times but rapid at other times. As technology
and economic development have exponentially increased in the
twentieth century, so have strains on the traditional ideas of sov-
ereignty. Prior to the advent of air power, the conceptualization
of sovereignty was primarily land and sea based. This concep-
tion had become somewhat entrenched with little incentive for
change. With the development of aerospace technologies, a cat-
alyst formed that speeded the development of modern concepts
I United States Air Force, Legal Advisor, Office of Defense Cooperation,
Athens, Greece. Previous positions include: Deputy Staff Judge Advocate, Shaw
Air Force Base, South Carolina, 1999-2001; Staff Judge Advocate, 20th
Expeditionary Operations Group (ALLIED FORCE), Bandirma, Turkey, 1999;
Chief of Operations and Civil Law, Shaw Air Force Base South Carolina, 1998-
1999; Chief of Military Justice, Adverse Actions, and Claims, Hill Air Force Base,
Utah, 1995-1998; Chief Operations Training Branch, Weapons Director, 81st
Range Control Squadron, Tyndall Air Force Base, Florida, 1987-1992. Academic
degrees include: LL.M., Military (International & Operations law), The Judge
Advocate General's School, 2002; J.D., University of Utah, 1995; M.S.,
Management, Florida State University, 1990; B.S., Aviation Management,
Metropolitan State College of Denver, 1984.
2 President Franklin Roosevelt, Message to the Chicago Aviation Conference
of 1944, quoted in WENCESLAS J. WAGNER, INTERNATIONAL AIR TRANSPORTATION AS
AFFECTED By STATE SOVEREIGNTY 93 (1970).
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of airspace sovereignty. These developments coincided with
general changes in conceptions of sovereignty-changes that
are accelerating as the global environment rapidly develops.
The present global economy has sparked a debate about the
evolution of airspace sovereignty and continues to place great
pressure on leading states to develop new ideas about sover-
eignty over airspace in order to keep pace with the world's eco-
nomic growth. The oft-stated rule that a state has absolute
airspace sovereignty supra-adjacent to its territory abounds.'
Nonetheless, in spite of this near knee-jerk repeat of the "set-
tled" rule of absolute sovereignty over territorial airspace,
changes in the understanding and the characterizations of air-
space sovereignty have marched on in steady fashion. The
tragic events of September 11, 2001, will have profound effects
on unfolding trends, but the move towards a different kind of
airspace sovereignty regime will continue as economic and
other forces drive change.
This paper begins by discussing early conceptions of state sov-
ereignty as related to the air, sea, rivers, and rights of innocent
passage and commerce, with a review of the historical develop-
ment of airspace sovereignty. The paper then reviews how the
advent of airspace transportation impacted these concepts in
fundamental ways as the twentieth century air transportation sys-
tem developed. Next, the paper will discuss the current airspace
sovereignty regime in the United States and how U.S. law cur-
rently regulates airspace with regard to national security issues,
including control of contiguous airspace and the legal right of
the United States to shoot down intruding aircraft. Current
worldwide trends towards relinquishing airspace sovereignty will
be examined and will reveal continued movement towards a
global air economy, open skies, and regional consolidation of
national airspaces such as the Single European Sky. The paper
argues that there is a continuing trend away from the absolute
airspace sovereignty regime towards something less. The paper
3 Many texts and articles on the subject of air law begin with this pronounce-
ment taken from the "complete and exclusive" sovereignty language of Article 1
of the Convention on International Civil Aviation, opened for signature, Dec. 7,
1944, 61 Stat. 1180, 15 U.N.T.S. 295 (entered into force Apr. 4, 1947) [hereinaf-
ter Chicago Convention]. For purposes of this paper, the word "absolute" is used
to reflect the totality of the "complete and exclusive" language. Although the
word "absolute" occasionally carries negative connotations in international law
based on historical sovereignty theories from Hobbes and others, its use seems
appropriate here, as it is difficult to find any grammatical difference between
"absolute" and "complete and exclusive."
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will also discuss the impact of the events of September 11 and
their likely effect on these current trends. The paper will assert
that, despite economic pressure on states to release some air-
space sovereignty by delegating control to other entities, Sep-
tember 11 will dramatically affect some previously emerging
trends in light of a renewed emphasis on national security con-
cerns, especially in the United States. Within the United States,
the primary focus will temporarily shift from free airspace mar-
kets and airspace efficiencies to national security. This will in-
volve implementation of changes in airspace structures and
control procedures. Because airspace security needs may prove
to be an intractable problem, movement by the United States
towards the European Union's Single Airspace Model is unlikely
to happen anytime soon. The realities of U.S. geography de-
crease that likelihood simply because U.S. aircraft have a great
amount of territorial airspace in which to operate commercially
without intruding on the airspace of another state. Nonethe-
less, in spite the events of September 11, the economic pressures
to open airspace will persist, although tempered by security con-
cerns. These pressures will continue to drive the United States
and Europe towards the release of some aspects of their airspace
sovereignty, though each so in very different ways.
II. EARLY CONCEPTIONS OF STATE SOVEREIGNTY
RELATING TO THE SEA AND AIR, AND THE
RIGHTS OF INNOCENT PASSAGE
AND COMMERCE
Most modern conceptions of sovereignty began with the ad-
vent of the modern nation-state following the end of the Thirty-
Years War with the Peace of Westphalia in 1648.1 Jean Bodin, an
early leading authority on the principles of sovereignty and
statehood, considered sovereignty to be the absolute domain of
the state, "not limited either in power, or in function, or in
length of time."5 Sovereignty was so absolute that it was not
bound by law.6 Hugo Grotius, often considered the father of
4 Louis HENKIN ET. AL., INTERNATIONAL LAW: CASES AND MATERIALS xxxiv (2d
ed. 1987).
5 JEAN BODIN, ON SOVEREIGNTY: FOUR CHAPTERS FROM THE Six BooKs OF THE
COMMONWEALTH 3 (Julian H. Franklin ed. & trans. Cambridge Univ. Press 1992)
(1583).
6 Ruwantissa I.R. Abeyratne, The Philosophy of Air Law, 37 AM. J. JuRis. 135
(1992).
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international law,7 thought sovereignty to be so absolute that it
was "not subject to the controul of any other power, so as to be
annulled at the pleasure of any other human will."' These early
conceptions of sovereignty influenced the creation of the laws of
the United States when Chief Justice John Marshall declared
that "[o]ne sovereign being [was] in no respect amenable to an-
other."9 Yet, from the beginning, these early conceptions of sov-
ereignty as supreme, absolute, and uncontrollable were
challenged by technological limitations and the necessities of
travel and commerce.
Beginning conceptions of sovereignty were property based.
These conceptions began with the idea that all property, being
res communes,10 was appropriated by express agreement or simple
occupancy.1 Some things, however, were simply considered
"impossible to be reduced to a state of property."'12 Thus, the
sea, being difficult to appropriate and impossible to contain, was
one of the first areas where the sovereignty of the state was
limited.' 3
7 Boutros Boutros-Ghali, Essay: The Role of International Law in the Twenty-First
Century: A Grotian Moment, 18 FORDHAM INT'L L.J. 1609, 1609 (1995).
8 HUGO GROTIUS, THE RIGHTS OF WAR AND PEACE 62 (A.C. Campbell trans., M.
Walter Dunne ed. 1901) (1625).
9 The Schooner Exchange v. McFaddon, 11 U.S. 116, 137 (1812). In the case,
U.S. citizens owned a vessel that was forcibly seized under the orders of Napo-
leon, the French emperor. The ship later sailed into an American port under a
French flag and the citizens filed a libel action to reclaim it. The district court
denied the libel action for lack of jurisdiction. The appellate court reversed the
district court's conclusion that it lacked jurisdiction and its denial of relief. The
Supreme Court reversed and found that the vessel was a national armed vessel in
the service of the emperor of France. The Court held that when the vessel en-
tered American territory, it did so under the implied promise that the vessel was
exempt from United States jurisdiction and enjoyed sovereign immunity. This
judicially created rule of absolute foreign sovereign immunity was not signifi-
cantly modified until the passage of the Foreign Sovereign Immunities Act of
1976, 28 U.S.C. §§ 1602-1611 (West 1994).
10 Res communes are things that are used and enjoyed by everyone but can never
be exclusively acquired as a whole. BLACK'S LAw DICTIONARY 1304-05 (6th ed.
1990).
11 GROTIUS, supra note 8, at 89. Grotius believed that res communes existed only
so long as it was convenient; thus, as soon as persons or groups had the notion of
ownership of land, it was only "natural to suppose it must have been generally
agreed, that whatever any one had occupied should be accounted his own." Id.
12 Id.
13 Id. at 89-90. The same rule applied to the air, except that Grotius could not
conceive of the use of the air without the simultaneous use of land underneath.
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This view of the sea as res communes was one of the few limita-
tions on princely sovereignty not placed on a state by the mere
existence of other states. Being unable to effectively exclude
others from using the sea, the sea-going states wanted the unlim-
ited right of access to the seas along with the concurrent bene-
fits of commerce and exploration. Only those areas of the sea
close to the shores of a particular state were considered limited
in use by others, and then only to the extent that charges or
taxes could be laid on the party traversing these coastal areas.
14
As exploration and sea travel increased, the benefits of trade
and commerce were soon understood to be an implicit part of
these rights of travel. The right of trade with foreign nations
began with the notion that natural law gave "every man the right
to obtain for himself the things he has need of, by purchasing
them at a fair price from those who have no personal need of
them. ' 15 The rights of trade were imperfect because they could
not be compelled. Similarly, the right of innocent passage over
owned property was imperfect until it became perfect by right of
necessity. Thus, the right of innocent passage attached only
when the necessity of the innocent passage overcame the inter-
est of the owner in excluding the traveler.' 6 Accordingly, the
rights of trade and innocent passage, in combination with the
interest of states in obtaining goods they could not produce
themselves, created one of the principle forces countering no-
tions of unlimited sovereignty."
Grotius believed that international law included the rights of
innocent passage for both peoples dispossessed of their land
and armies fighting just wars.'" He saw no difference between
the rights of states fighting just wars to pass over a third party
14 BODIN, supra note 5, at 83 (stating the "rights to the sea belong solely to the
sovereign prince, who can impose charges up to thirty leagues from his coast
unless there is a sovereign prince nearer by to prevent him").
15 3 EDWARD DE VATTEL, THE LAW OF NATIONS OR THE PRINCIPLES OF NATURAL
LAW APPLIED TO THE AFFAIRS OF NATIONS AND OF SOVEREIGNS 40 (Charles G. Fen-
wick trans., Carnegie Inst. of Wash. 1916) (1758).
16 See id. at 150.
17 Commerce by its very nature is an implicit limitation on absolute sover-
eignty. A state wishing to trade with other states must generally recognize the
rights of other states to travel and trade over its sovereign territory in order to get
reciprocal rights to travel and trade over the sovereign territory of other states.
Thus, a state's inability to be totally self-sufficient was the first real limitation on
state sovereignty. Over time, it was simply in most states' best interest to give up
some measure of territorial sovereignty in order to achieve the benefits of inter-
state commerce.
18 See GROTIUS, supra note 8, at 95.
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state's territory, and the rights of states trading with distant
states to do the same. "[F]ree passage ought to be allowed not
only to persons, but to merchandise. For no power has a right
to prevent one nation from trading with another at remote dis-
tance; a permission which for the interest of society should be
maintained."'19 Those having the rights of innocent passage also
had the right to stop in the state they were passing through in
cases of sickness or emergency.2 These early rights of innocent
passage had significant implications on later developments in
the concepts of air sovereignty. 2'
Just as the concept of innocent passage arose, there emerged
the concept of "innocent use." Innocent use applied to things
"of which the use is inexhaustible, such as the sea and running
water. ' 22 These running waters were considered the various riv-
ers that ran through states' sovereign territories. Persons had
the right to use these rivers so long as the use did not "inconve-
nience" the sovereign state.23 Accordingly, anything which
could be "useful to another without loss or inconvenience to the
owner [was,] in that respect, inexhaustible by use, and therefore
the natural law reserve [d] to all men a right to it."'2 4 The right
of innocent use was imperfect because it could be limited by the
state in times of war or when the use was otherwise detrimental
to the state allowing it. Nonetheless, innocent passage or use
having no detrimental effect on the state granting them was not
a right to be limited by the state.
From the very beginning of the modern nation-state concept,
jurists claimed that state sovereignty was limited by the necessity
of commerce as well as innocent use and passage. Sovereignty
over adjacent air and seas was limited by the lack of existing
technology to exclude others from their use. Therefore, these
areas were not considered subject to state sovereignty. However,
this changed when the effective use of airspace became a reality.
How were the existing concepts of sovereignty to be applied to
this new realm of air? Was airspace really res communes, or was it
to be analogous to "rivers of air" for which the rights of innocent
19 Id. at 97.
20 Id. at 98.
21 See infra note 93 and accompanying text. The right of innocent passage and
emergency stopping are later adopted as the first two freedoms of the air.
22 HENRY WHEATON, ELEMENTS OF INTERNATIONAL LAw § 193 at 274 (Richard
Henry Dana ed., 8th ed. 1866).
23 Id.
24 VAIrEL, supra note 15, at 152.
AIRSPACE SOVEREIGNTY
passage and use applied? In the end, state security and com-
merce were the forces that shaped this new, emerging sover-
eignty concept.
III. THE IMPACT OF AIR TRANSPORTATION ON
AIRSPACE SOVEREIGNTY-THE HISTORICAL
DEVELOPMENT OF AIR RIGHTS
The development of airspace sovereignty concepts as related
to airspace supra-adjacent to state territory involved three dis-
tinct ideas: airspace as private property, airspace as res communes
or res nullius,25 and airspace as state property. The first of these
concepts concerned private ownership of supra -adjacent air-
space by subjacent private property owners as against other pri-
vate property owners and the state in which the property was
located. Though private air rights are of secondary importance
with regard to airspace sovereignty issues today, such rights were
of pre-eminent historical concern prior to the advent of air
transportation.
A. AIRSPACE AS PROPERTY OF THE SUBJACENT LAND OWNER
By their own nature, air rights can assume various forms. The
form that probably developed first was the notion that airspace
above private property was owned by the owner of the subjacent
property. This property-based form of air law had its origin in
Roman law. The Romans, in attempting to protect the private
rights of its citizens, developed the maxim cujus est solum, ejus est
usque ad coelum, meaning the "right of land ownership brings
with it rights of ownership of airspace above that land. ''26 Ro-
man citizens wanted the right to control the projection of items
from adjacent properties that would interfere with the use of
their own property. Interference could take the form of distur-
bances to air, light, and rainwater. 27 Roman law was not con-
25 Res Communes refers to things used and enjoyed by everyone that can never
be exclusively acquired as a whole. BLACK'S LAw DICTIONARY, supra note 10, at
1304. Conversely, in Roman law, res nullius refers to property that belongs to no
one and which is not susceptible to private ownership. Id. at 1306.
26 Abeyratne, supra note 6, at 135. Literally translated, the phrase means
"whose is the soil, his it is up to the sky." BLACK's LAW DICTIONARY, supra note 10,
at 341. One commentator points out that Roman views on the subject of air law
were far from well established and found evidence that the Romans viewed the
air as belonging to the whole community. WAGNER, supra note 2, at 11. This,
however, seems to be the minority view.
27 Herbert D. Klein, Cujus Est Solum Ejus Est... Quousque Tandem?, 26J. AIR L.
& COM. 237, 241 (1959).
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cerned with trespasses through airspaces lasting only minutes or
seconds but only with trespasses of a more permanent nature.2"
Although there has been much debate on whether the Romans
really believed in the ad coelum concept, it is clear that the Ro-
mans recognized interests in airspace. Roman law probably
viewed air in three ways: first, airspace over public lands had the
same legal status as the surface, which was state control; second,
air was common to all to sustain life and thus, common to all
men; and third, airspace over private lands was the property of
the landowner to an indefinite height subject only to building
restrictions. 29 Hence, the "air" and the "space" were viewed in
two different ways-the air itself as res communes and the actual
space as private property. Some commentators later attempted
to reconcile this dichotomy as being consistent with the tradi-
tional view of property, stating that the vested right of the owner
to construct or plant extended to an indefinite height. How-
ever, until a landowner exercised his rights, the airspace could
be treated as public or common property. 0
The Roman rule was subsequently adapted under English
common law to mean that no state acquired any domain in what
was known as navigable airspace until it was needed to protect
subjacent territory.31 The reason for this modification was that
jurists could not accept a maxim that was not shown by "com-
mon law [to have] always been the custom to observe. 3 2 Thus,
a linkage arose between the use of airspace by others and neces-
sary protection of the subjacent land. This was clearly sup-
ported by both American and English courts."
For example, in England, actions for trespass were often dis-
missed where the object passed over the subjacent land or hung
over the subjacent land of another without touching it. 4 Only
28 Id.
29 Id.
30 Mary B. Spector, Note, Vertical and Horizontal Aspects of Takings Jurisprudence:
Is Airspace Property, 7 CARDOZO L. REv. 487, 500 (1986).
31 Abeyratne, supra note 6, at 135-36. The word "state" probably means, in this
context, both state sovereignty as it relates to other states and the public property
rights of the citizens of a state in airspace-both as limitations to private property
claims of individual citizens to airspace extending indefinitely above private land.
32 Id. (quoting 1 WILLIAM BLACKSTONE, COMMENTARIES 68).
33 Id.
34 See Albert I. Moon,Jr., A Look at Airspace Sovereignty, 29J. AIR L. & COM. 328,
329 (1963). Moon cites as examples Pickering v. Rudd, 4 Camp. 219 (Eng. 1815)
(ruling a board overhanging plaintiffs garden not a trespass) and Clifton v. Bury,
4 T.L.R. 8 (1887) (holding bullets fired 75 feet over another's land not a
trespass).
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if, for example, a bullet fired over land fell on the land, could an
action in trespass be brought. If an overhanging object did not
immediately fall on the land when it was being hung, then only
an action on the case could be brought.1
5
In the United States, the Supreme Court finally put the unlim-
ited property notion of airspace above land to rest in 1945. The
Court stated:
It is ancient doctrine that a common law ownership of the land
extended to the periphery of the universe-Cujus est solum ejus est
usque ad coelum. But that doctrine has no place in the modern
world. The air is a public highway.... Were that not true, every
transcontinental flight would subject the operator to countless
trespass suits. Common sense revolts at the idea. To recognize
such private claims to the airspace would ... transfer into private
ownership that to which only the public has a just claim.36
Even before Causby, the private property notion of unlimited
ownership of airspace had become antiquated by the end of the
nineteenth century. A "strata" approach to private ownership of
airspace was, in one form or another, being developed and de-
bated. Under this approach, airspace above private property
was "owned" by the owner of the land below but only in the
lower strata. 7 The delineation between the upper and lower
strata was never really fixed by the courts except as it related to
the peaceful enjoyment of the land below. Naturally, the devel-
opment of air transportation technology greatly influenced this
debate.
At least six theories of airspace property were discussed in the
early part of the twentieth century.3" The "absolute ownership"
theory of Roman law was rejected outright, as was the "no own-
ership" theory.3 9 This left four intermediate theories: easement,
privilege, fixed height, and effective possession. Under the
"easement" theory, property was subject to a public easement to
aviation traffic. This theory acknowledged property ownership
in air above private property subject to the easement so a tres-
35 See Pickering, 4 Camp. at 221.
36 Moon, supra note 34, at 330 (quoting United States v. Causby, 328 U.S. 256,
260-61 (1945)).
37 Kevin Gray, Property in Thin Air, 50 CAMBIDGE L.J. 252, 253-54 (1991).
38 Colin Cahoon, Comment, Low Altitude Airspace: A Property Rights No-Man's
Land, 56J. AIR L. & CoM. 157, 163 (1990).
39 See id. at 164, 169. The "no-ownership" theory involved the idea that no
airspace was actually owned unless it was actually occupied by the subjacent
landowner.
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pass was only actionable if the easement was misused.40 The
"privilege" theory was similar to the easement theory in that tres-
pass into private airspace was privileged and, therefore, a de-
fense to the trespass. Both theories allowed traversal of the
subjacent property as long as there was no misuse. The fixed-
height or "strata" theory depended on legislative actions defin-
ing the level of the upper strata, usually called "navigable air-
space." It was clearly the easiest theory to administer. The
"effective-possession" theory, on the other hand, was nothing
more than a twist on the fixed-height theory whereby the deter-
mination of the maximum height of the lower strata depended
on the nature of the land and its possible uses.41 These last two
approaches formed the basis of the modern approach to air-
space as private property: ownership limited by the definition of
navigable airspace with navigable airspace being defined by the
state based on the nature of the activity occurring on the land
below.
B. THE RES COMMUNES/AIRSPACE SOVEREIGNTY DICHOTOMY
The second major air rights concept to develop was most
likely the concept of airspace as common property owned by
all.42 Although the notion of airspace as res communes should
have logically developed before the concept of airspace as pri-
vate property, there seems to be little discussion of it prior to the
rise of Roman law. As discussed above, Roman law viewed air-
space as private property and it was not until much later that
jurists began to analyze air rights in the context of international
law. Like his views on the sea, Grotius forwarded the proposi-
tion that the air could not be reduced to private property, and
thus, was "common property, except that no one can use or en-
joy it, without at the same time using the ground over which it
passes or rests."43 This concept of airspace as res communes likely
40 Id. at 164.
41 See id. at 165-66.
42 The view of property as res communes is entirely distinct from the concept of
state property. Res communes refers to property belonging to all "to be used and
enjoyed by everyone." BLACK'S LAW DICTIONARY, supra note 10, at 1304-05. State
property includes, among other things, "public" property belonging collectively
to the citizens of "the entire state or community, id. at 1217, but this "public"
property is not res communes because it does not belong to the citizens of other
states.
43 GROTIUS, supra note 8, at 89-90. Implicit in Grotius' statement is the admis-
sion that use of the airspace impacts the ground below, and thus the statement
seems to admit that its use could interfere with the rights of subjacent property
124
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arose because of the inability of states to appropriate airspace
and exclude other states from its use-a concept identical to
that of the seas as res communes.44
Naturally, the concept of airspace as res communes conflicted
directly with views that airspace supra-adjacent to sovereign ter-
ritory was also the sovereign territory of the subjacent state.45 It
is important to note that, with respect to the airspace sover-
eignty/res communes dichotomy, the private property notion of
airspace rights falls squarely in the airspace sovereignty camp.
In other words, "[elven the property of individuals, taken as a
whole, is to be regarded as the property of the Nation with re-
spect to other Nations. In a sense it really belongs to the Na-
tion, because of the rights which the Nation has over it and
because it constitutes part of the sum total of national wealth
and power. 4 6
Airspace sovereignty was the last major air rights concept to
formally develop. With the advent of the airplane, the begin-
ning of the twentieth century saw the emergence of state sover-
eignty claims over supra-adjacent airspace, claims which were
previously unnecessary. This is not to say that the formal devel-
opment of airspace sovereignty was an abrupt change in states'
approaches to airspace ownership:
This is no more than a modern, legislative version of the rights
which ...States have since Roman times continuously recog-
nized, regulated and protected; they were rules of private law in
favor of owners or occupants of lands on the surface below, but
constitut[ing] proof that States have always claimed and exer-
cised territorial sovereignty in space above their surface.4 7
owners. This idea conflicts directly with the reasons for the Roman ad coelum
concept-the protection of a private property owners rights to air, light, and
rain.
44 This same inability would, of course, apply to the inability of private prop-
erty owners to exclude others from the use of the vast majority of airspace supra-
adjacent to private property.
45 Note that the debate regarding air as res communes differed markedly with
regard to airspace above the high seas and land not owned by any state, e.g.
Antarctica, because those areas did not typically involve either private property or
sovereignty claims.
46 VATTEL, supra note 15, at 138. The air rights debate can be viewed in two
ways: 1) the limitation of private property rights in airspace by either the state or
res communes, or 2) the limitations of airspace as res communes by state sovereignty
or private property claims or both.
47 Klein, supra note 27, at 238.
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C. DEVELOPMENT OF AIRSPACE SOVEREIGNTY CONCEPTS BEFORE
WORLD WAR I
Several theories arose prior to World War I in an attempt to
define the limits, if any, of this newly evolving concept of sover-
eignty over airspace. Pufendorf, more than two centuries prior
to the invention of the airplane, advocated his belief that a
"man's sovereignty in the air was limited by the ability for effec-
tive control."48 Pufendorf's referral to "man's sovereignty" prob-
ably referred to the ability of both private property owners and
states to exclude others in the generic sense. This proposition
was reasonable and emulated the prevailing view that sover-
eignty over the seas was not part of international law because a
state could not effectively exclude other states from its use-the
hallmark of state control.
In the two decades prior to World War I there was a wide
divergence of thought over how much sovereignty a state had
over its supra-adjacent airspace. At one end of the spectrum was
the view of airspace as res communes. "Scholars influenced by the
rule of freedom of the high seas, advocated the absolute free-
dom of air navigation. "14 These scholars included Fauchille,
who submitted a draft code of the air in 1902.50 In it he stated
that "[t] he air is free. States have in the air in time of peace and
in time of war only those rights which are necessary for their
preservation. "51 At the other end of the debate were those
scholars, influenced by traditional notions of sovereignty, who
advocated that a state had absolute sovereignty over all airspace
supra-adjacent to its territory. "[T]he state's full right of sover-
eignty in the entire airspace above its territory and territorial
waters is demanded by existing legal principles and by the inter-
ests of states themselves and mankind in general.
52
48 See Moon, supra note 34, at 330.
49 Jeswald W. Salacuse, The Little Prince and the Businessman: Conflicts and Ten-
sions in Public International Air Law, 45 J.AIR L. & COM. 807, 810 (1980).
50 HAROLD D. HAZELTINE, THE LAW OF THE AIR 4 (photo reprint 1971) (1911).
Although Fauchille recognized the need for state security in an airspace regime,
his premise started with the principle that the "air is free in all its parts." Id. at 20
(quoting Paul Fauchille).
5' Id. at 16-17.
52 Id. at 44. Hazeltine was uncompromising in his view that absolute airspace
sovereignty was the correct legal regime. He did not see such a regime as a hin-
drance or restriction on the development of air transportation and commerce as
some of his contemporaries did. To the contrary, Hazeltine predicted that uni-
form regulation of air navigation would come about more readily if the doctrine
of absolute airspace sovereignty were adopted. Id. at 30-31. His prediction came
126
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Of course, as with the sovereignty over the seas, sovereignty
over airspace could only be absolute if the subjacent state had
the right to use and possess the supra-adjacent airspace to the
exclusion of others. This required three things. First, the right
to use supra-adjacent airspace was linked to the social needs of
the subjacent state. Thus, there was no absolute sovereignty
where the subjacent state did not need the use of the airspace
above its territory." This idea of necessity came from natural
law notions that "no Nation may lawfully appropriate an extent
of territory entirely disproportionate to its needs, and thus re-
strict the opportunity of settlement and sustenance for other
Nations. ''54 Second, the right to possess supra-adjacent airspace
required the will to hold it as an owner, the will to exclude
others from its use, and the will to claim it for one's self.55 Fi-
nally, absolute sovereignty required the ability to control the air-
space to the exclusion of others, often thought of in modern
terms as the ability to legislate over the airspace.56
Three intermediate theories of airspace sovereignty also
emerged prior to World War I. The first theory advocated free-
dom of the air existing above a certain altitude with airspace
below that altitude being the "territorial air" of the subjacent
state.5 ' This approach embodied both extremes at the same
time, absolute airspace sovereignty and absolute freedom of the
air. The second theory followed a functionalist approach of lim-
ited sovereignty, whereby absolute sovereignty existed over
supra-adjacent airspace depending on the type of aircraft or use
to be made of the airspace by other states.58 Thus, for example,
a state could claim sovereignty over supra-adjacent air to prevent
passage of military aircraft but not civil aircraft. In reality, this
"limited sovereignty" approach was nothing more than a varia-
tion on the absolute sovereignty model.59 In theory at least, the
true upon the signing of the Convention on International Civil Aviation 36 years
later, Article 1 of which declared a state's complete and exclusive sovereignty
over its airspace. See Chicago Convention, supra note 3, art. I. This Convention is
discussed in more detail, infra Part IV.C.
53 See Abeyratne, supra note 6, at 142.
54 VA=TEL, supra note 15, at 140.
55 Id.
56 Id. at 143. These three touchstones of absolute sovereignty apply to all
claims of absolute sovereignty over any type of territory, body of water, air, or
space.
57 See Salacuse, supra note 49, at 810.
58 Id. at 811.
59 WAGNER, supra note 2, at 25.
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term "limited sovereignty" is an oxymoron because the very con-
cept of sovereignty entails the full power of the state. Thus, the
functionalist approach is more easily explained as absolute sov-
ereignty over supra-adjacent airspace with innocent passage
granted by the subjacent state to certain types of aircraft-a the-
ory similar to the innocent passage of traffic on rivers passing
through sovereign territory. The third model combined both of
the above intermediate approaches. It provided for absolute
sovereignty over airspace above a state up to a certain altitude
and limited sovereignty above that altitude only to the extent
necessary for the protection of the subjacent state. This was the
approach advocated by the Frenchman Paul Fauchille, the lead-
ing advocate of freedom of the air.60 Fauchille pushed for set-
ting an arbitrary limit above the ground, above which absolute
freedom of the air would exist. The limit he proposed was 330
meters, the height of the Eiffel Tower (300 meters) plus the
maximum height for structures carrying electric power (30
meters) 61
In 1910, various states met at the International Conference on
Air Navigation, held in an attempt to define airspace sovereignty
in international law.62 The conference failed to achieve its
objectives, although it did bring into focus the various ap-
proaches regarding different "regime[s] of the air."' 63 Great
Britain and its supporters at the Conference believed that air-
space sovereignty extended usque ad coelum and a state "was not
required to treat foreign and national aircraft on an equal ba-
sis."64 This view likely resulted from Great Britain's long strug-
gle to secure domination over the seas and obtain security for its
islands.65 Because security concerns were paramount to the
British, creating new security risks by having foreign aircraft
freely transiting British airspace did not entice the British to be
supportive of any freedom of the air approaches. On the other
hand, France advocated limited sovereignty whereby a state
could only enact certain regulations that would protect its inter-
ests. France had begun to dominate the development of the art
60 See id. at 18; supra note 50 and accompanying text.
61 WAGNER, supra note 2, at 18. Fauchille did not believe it likely that any fu-
ture structure would ever surpass the height of the Eiffel Tower.
62 See Dr. D. Goedhuis, The Air Sovereignty Concept and United States Influence on
Its Future Development, 22J. AIR L. & CoM. 209, 210 (1955).
63 Id.
64 Salacuse, supra note 49, at 812.
6 See WAGNER, supra note 2, at 12.
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of flying at that time, and from its dominant role in aviation the
theory of freedom of the air probably made good sense. Al-
though the 1910 Conference ended with no firm agreement,
there was general agreement that there was some limit to air-
space sovereignty supra-adjacent to national territory.66 This de-
bate over airspace sovereignty changed fundamentally with the
advent of World War I.
D. AIRSPACE SOVEREIGNrY VIEWS FOLLOWING WORLD WAR I
World War I set in motion two dichotomous forces that even-
tually shaped modern airspace sovereignty views. The war, at
once, demonstrated the incredible potential of air transporta-
tion on state commerce and the incredible destructiveness that
air power could wreak during all-out war. "By the end of the
war, air law was regarded as a discipline that accepted [a] ir to be
a free commodity except when it was connected to owned prop-
erty."67 The need for a state to protect itself prevailed over the
advantages to be gained by freedom of commerce by air. The
actions of states with regard to various national legislation and
diplomatic actions in response to various aerial incidents,
demonstrated that states had "definitively rejected absolute free-
dom of the air and enforced the principle of sovereignty to the
point where it appeared to be a customary rule of international
law. " 6 8
Accordingly, following World War I the custom of states to
claim absolute airspace sovereignty became the international
norm. Applying this custom as international law was consistent
with the "pure theory of law" which postulated that the basic
norm of international law is international legal custom. 69 "In
this context, the philosophy of air law [was] founded on the
concept of sovereignty in airspace and would sustain its credibil-
ity through this customary concept" until something occurred to
change the international norm.70 What occurred after World
War I were several attempts by international agreement to
change this international norm through a variety of legal
regimes.
66 Goedhuis, supra note 62, at 211.
67 Abeyratne, supra note 6, at 137-38. In this context, "owned" refers to state
property rights in airspace that encompass the private property rights of the citi-
zens of the state. See supra note 46 and accompanying text.
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IV. WENTIETH CENTURY REGIMES OF AIRSPACE
SOVEREIGNTY AFTER WORLD WAR I
A. THE PARiS CONVENTION OF 1919-ABSOLUTE STATE
SOVEREIGNTY OVER SUPRA-ADJACENT AIRSPACE PREVAILS
The perceived costs of freedom of the air increased dramati-
cally after World War I due to the severe threat of aircraft as
weapons. Although states recognized the possible commercial
advantages of technological advances in aircraft, they worried
about the military aspects of aircraft development.71
The first multi-lateral treaty concerning air law was signed fol-
lowing the 1919 Paris Convention.72 Twenty years of debates
over territorial airspace ended with a formal recognition under
Article 1 of the treaty that "every Power has complete and exclu-
sive sovereignty over the air space above its territory."" The use
of the word "recognize" indicates that the international norm or
custom in evidence prior to the Paris Convention had prevailed,
and that "sovereignty over airspace was a customary principle of
international law which existed apart from the Convention and
did not come into existence because of it.'' 74 This formal recog-
nition of airspace sovereignty gave all states the right under in-
ternational law to enact regulations and use sovereign police
powers any way they wished over their sovereign airspace.
Of the possible freedoms of the air,75 the only freedom of the
air formally recognized by the Paris Convention was expressed
in Article 2. Article 2 provided for the right of innocent passage
to foreign aircraft; a right similar to the innocent passage rights
of foreign ships in the territorial waters of a state.76 The first
freedom of the air-the right to fly over another state-became
71 CHRISTEN JONSSON, INTERNATIONAL AVIATION AND THE POLITICS OF REGIME
CHANGE 156 (1987).
72 Convention Relating to the Regulation of Aerial Navigation, Oct. 13, 1919,
11 L.N.T.S. 173 [hereinafter Paris Convention].
73 Salacuse, supra note 49, at 813 (quoting the Paris Convention, supra note 72,
art. 1). Thirty-two states eventually ratified the treaty, although the U.S. was not
one of them. Id. at n. 25. The United States unilaterally asserted sovereignty over
its airspace by means of the Air Commerce Act of 1926, ch. 344, 44 Stat. 568
(1926).
74 Salacuse, supra note 49 at 814. There is little evidence prior to World War I
that international law relating to airspace sovereignty (as demonstrated by inter-
national norm or custom) involved any realistic notions of freedom of the air
above supra-adjacent territory.
7 See infra note 94 and accompanying text for a discussion of the five major
freedoms of the air recognized by states.
76 Salacuse, supra note 49, at 815.
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part of formally recognized international law. This freedom was
accorded to all aircraft regardless of nationality, but the grant-
ing state could impose restrictions and limitations on the over-
flying aircraft.77 Consequently, the Convention, in the same
instant, adopted aspects of both airspace sovereignty and free-
dom of the air.
The Paris Convention set up an incomplete framework be-
cause it failed to deal with the problem of the rights of aircraft
to land in a foreign state and totally ignored what was to become
the primary impetus for future agreements, international com-
mercial aviation. With the exception of innocent passage, the
Paris Convention seemed to stand for little except formal recog-
nition of the customary international norm of sovereignty over
the air. However, viewed another way, the Paris Convention rep-
resented the triumph of equality of states over the "power-orien-
tated" approach to international law.7 9 This approach favored
the more technologically advanced and powerful states that,
under a freedom of the air regime, would be able to take advan-
tage of all air resources. On the other hand, unrestricted sover-
eignty implied equality between states, large and small, powerful
and weak. Thus, absolute state sovereignty over airspace 1) en-
sured that the smaller or weaker states would have the right to
prevent exploitation of their air resources by the air powers and
2) ensured that states like the United States, which had large
land areas, gained protection and control over their large supra-
adjacent airspace masses. Sovereignty over airspace became, in
a sense, the great equalizer. " [T] he adoption of the principle of
sovereignty may have placed the international community irrev-
ocably on the path of seeking an international legal framework
for aviation which would be acceptable to both large and small
states alike."80
77 Id. For example, the state granting passage could "prescribe the route
which such aircraft might take, prohibit flight over certain areas for military or
public safety purposes, and require such aircraft to land on its territory for 'rea-
sons of general security."' Id. (quoting Article 15 of the Paris Convention which
repeats Article 2 in allowing "every aircraft of a contracting state ... to cross the
airspace of another state without landing"). Note that the right of the citizens
within a state to fly in their state's sovereign airspace was not affected by the Paris
Convention. Those rights were determined by the individual state exerting sover-
eign power over its own citizens.
78 Id. at 815.
79 Id.
80 Salacuse, supra note 49, at 814.
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B. THE AIR CONFERENCE OF 1929-THE FIRST FREEDOM
ERODES, AN UNRESTRICTED SOVEREIGNTY REGIME CONTINUES
With "the war to end all wars" over, consideration of the com-
mercial aspects of air sovereignty continued to grow. In order
to develop the commercial advantages that pertained to air
transportation, one would have imagined that states would be
willing to give up more of their airspace sovereignty. Apprecia-
tion for international law had been growing with the advent of
the League of Nations, and Europe was in a massive rebuilding
phase. But this willingness never materialized. In 1929, the
United Kingdom wished to establish air service that would fly
over the Belgian Congo. Belgium opposed this, and the issue
was taken up at the Air Conference of 1929.81 Of the thirty-one
states participating in the conference, twenty-seven completely
abandoned the first freedom of the air-the freedom of traffic.
Only the United States, United Kingdom, Sweden, and the
Netherlands continued to consider the restriction of air sover-
eignty as a necessity.8 2 What prompted this great retreat into
the shelter of absolute sovereignty? Considerations of national
security were discussed, but it was uncertainty of the states over
their own ability to compete and fear of commercial competi-
tion that primarily influenced the retrogressive move back to
the total air sovereignty concept.8 3 This move away from the
first freedom of the air continued with the eventual withdrawal
of both the United Kingdom and the United States from the
first freedom camp. As a result, the robust development of in-
tercontinental air transportation was delayed for years until well
into World War 11.84
81 Goedhuis, supra note 62, at 212.
82 Id. at 213.
83 Id. This retrogression resulted because of the "unimaginative" attitude of
states in approaching commercial development of state airspaces. No attention
was paid to the negative effects that absolute airspace sovereignty claims might
have on the development of the world's airlines, including the airlines belonging
to the states aggressively advocating the absolute sovereignty approach. Id. Com-
petition, which would have forced increases in efficiency and cost control, disap-
peared and led to the near collapse of many state owned airlines, especially in
Europe, once competitive pressures later appeared.
84 Id. One major attempt to help commercial aviation develop prior to World
War II occurred in 1929 with the creation of the Convention for the Unification
of Certain Rules Relating to International transportation by Air, open for signa-
ture Oct. 12, 1929, 49 Stat. 3000, 137 L.N.T.S 11, reprinted in 49 U.S.C.A. § 40105
(West 2001). Commonly called the Warsaw Convention, this international agree-
ment, along with its subsequent amendments and protocols, is still the primary
and most widely accepted private international air law system governing the uni-
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C. THE CHICAGO AvIATION CONFERENCE OF 1944-A FINAL
ATTEMPT TO INSTITUTE THE FREEDOMS OF THE AIR
In 1943, President Roosevelt, believing that it was once again
time to pursue world agreement on the future of air transporta-
815tion, encouraged another attempt to establish a worldwide
agreement on freedom of the air. After the conference, called
the Chicago Aviation Conference of 1944, convened, the United
States attempted to get other states at the conference to agree to
give up their airspace sovereignty to the extent that it restricted
air transportation. The United States did not advocate freedom
of the air in the way that Fauchille did, that is, as an express
limitation on a state's sovereignty over its airspace.86 Rather, it
campaigned for "freedom of the air" in a commercial sense.87
Air transportation privileges similar to those customary in the
carriage of commerce at sea were sought. 88 At the time of the
Conference, the United States dominated world aviation, having
over 20,000 transport aircraft.89 Thus, it was only natural that it
wanted to develop this great commercial resource. With World
War II coming to a close, the international focus was on the way
individual states and their national airlines could develop the
commercial aspects of air transportation. "'Freedom of the air'
as a slogan had been replaced by 'free trade by air.' " Con-
cerns of national security played a small role in the negotiations.
Considerations of air commerce were clearly more important.
This was probably due to a lack of any perceived threats from
the air at the time of the Conference combined with evidence of
the great potential of air commerce gleaned from its tremen-
dous use during the war. This opportunity was recognized by
President Roosevelt who saw the possibility of avoiding the clos-
ing great masses of airspace in the same way that states tried to
close off the great sea areas during the age of empire building.9"
form regulation of the conditions of international air transportation. Its primary
mechanism is the limitation of air carrier liability for damages to passengers and
cargo. The original liability limit in 1929 was about $8300 per passenger for
death or injury. MAREK ZvLICZ, INTERNATIONAL AIR TRANSPORT LAw 89-90 (1992).
The Warsaw Convention aided private international air transportation because it
supplied predictability for the air carriers.
85 See Goedhuis, supra note 62, at 213.
86 See supra note 50 and accompanying text.
87 DAVID JOHNSON, RIGHTS IN AIRSPACE 65 (1965).
88 Moon, supra note 34, at 332.
89 WAGNER, Supra note 2, at 81.
- Salacuse, supra note 49, at 820.
91 Goedhuis, supra note 62, at 219.
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Roosevelt was convinced that lasting peace could only be built in
a world in which commerce and transport were free. He wanted
to use the United States' dominating economic position to help
realize his vision.92
The Chicago Aviation Conference marked the beginning of a
formal discussion of the "freedoms of the air."93 Five freedoms
of the air were formally recognized:
1. The right of A's airline to overfly state B to get to state C.
2. The right of A's airline to land in B for fuel or mainte-
nance but not to pick up or discharge traffic, called a
"technical landing."
3. The right of A's airline to discharge traffic from A in B.
4. The right of A's airline to carry traffic back to A from B.
5. The right of A's airline to collect traffic in B and take to
C. 9 4
Interestingly, a dichotomy was created when those countries
advocating freedom of the air split into two camps. The United
States advocated the idea of free enterprise of the air through
the use of a multilateral convention with freedom of the air as its
foundation. New Zealand and Australia supported the idea of
res communes. Under the res communes view, an international air
transport authority would be created which would own the air-
craft and have the exclusive right to operate them on all interna-
tional air routes.95 In contrast, under the U.S. view, free
enterprise would reign, and any international aviation organiza-
tion would concern itself only with technical matters such as
navigation and safety.96 In this regard, the U.S. position par-
92 Id. at 219-20.
93 SeeJONSSON, supra note 71, at 31.
94 See JOHNSON, supra note 87, at 65. The first two freedoms are called the
"technical" or "transit" freedoms. The remaining three freedoms are called the
"commercial freedoms." Other freedoms of the air have since been identified
but are variations of the commercial freedoms. These include the freedom of
cabotage-the right to carry mail, passengers., or other cargo from one point in
the territory of a state to another point in the same state. See Zvucz, supra note
84, at 80.
95 See Salacuse, supra note 49, at 820.
96 Id. Salacuse notes that the British took a middle position by seeking "con-
trolled development" of aviation. Because the British concentrated on fighter
production during World War II, it would take time for them to adjust to the
manufacture of transport aircraft. Britain also feared the cost of subsidizing its
state airlines in the face of American air capability. As a result, Britain proposed
an international aviation organization that would have, not only technical power,
but also the ability to set rates, frequency, and allocation of air services by all
states. Id. at 821. The British position did not prevail.
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tially prevailed upon creation of the International Civil Aviation
Organization (ICAO) following the Chicago Conference. 7
ICAO became responsible for technical matters as well as prepa-
ration of draft conventions and recommendations on economic
matters. 98
As for the approaches to instituting freedoms of the air,
neither the U.S. nor the New Zealand/Australian view prevailed.
Other nations, fearing the commercial potential of the United
States aviation industry, opted instead to reaffirm the principle
of absolute sovereignty in supra-adjacent airspace. Article 1 of
the resulting Chicago Convention,99 one of the four agreements
negotiated at the Conference, was almost identical to Article 1
of the 1919 Paris Convention.' It reaffirmed that "every state
had complete and exclusive sovereignty over the airspace above
its territory."'0 1 Nonetheless, Article 5 of the Chicago Conven-
tion mitigated the harsh reaffirmation of absolute airspace sov-
ereignty by recognizing the first two freedoms of the air-but
only for non-scheduled air traffic. 0 2 The Chicago Convention did
not grant any freedoms of the air to scheduled air traffic absent
express permission of the state over which the aircraft intends to
fly. 103
97 ICAO was created under Articles 43-66 of the Chicago Convention. See Chi-
cago Convention, supra note 3, arts. 43-66.
98 ICAO became a specialized agency of the United Nations on May 13, 1947.
See I.H. PH. DIEDERIKS-VERSCHOOR, AN INTRODUCTION TO AIR LAW 39 (6th ed.
1997). It is a powerful organization with 161 members as of 1992. However, it
has minimal economic regulatory competence. ZvLicz, supra note 84, at 83-84.
99 The Chicago Convention does not apply to "state" aircraft such as military,
customs, and police aircraft. Chicago Convention, supra note 3, art. 3(a). There
is currently no universally accepted definition of a state aircraft and the legal
status of such aircraft is uncertain, mainly due to Article 3(a) of the Chicago
Convention. DIEDERJKS-VERSCHOOR, supra note 98, at 34.
100 See Paris Convention, supra note 72, art. 1; Salacuse, supra note 49, at 824.
101 Chicago Convention, supra note 3, art. 1. For a discussion of the various
agreements prepared during the Chicago Convention of 1944, see JOHNSON,
supra note 87, at 58-66.
102 Chicago Convention, supra note 3, art. 5. Non-scheduled traffic was an-
other name for traffic not associated with private or state owned airlines. This
was a giant loophole in the Chicago Convention because the growth of non-
scheduled air traffic surpassed that of scheduled traffic in the years following
World War II. Thus, the Chicago Convention unwittingly granted the technical
freedoms of the air to a large portion of the air traffic. It was not private aircraft
that became of concern but rather charter services. See DIEDERIKS-VERSCHOOR,
supra note 98, at 15-16.
103 Chicago Convention, supra note 3, art. 6. The vast amount of non-sched-
uled traffic such as charter operations had a great impact on commerce at that
time. As a result, many of the signatories of the convention ignored Article 5 by
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Sensing an imminent failure to achieve any type of acceptable
commercial freedoms of the air convention, a multi-lateral ap-
* proach to the problem was undertaken. Two side agreements
emerged from these talks. The International Air Services
Transit Agreement,1 4 otherwise known as the "Two Freedoms
Agreement," gave the contracting states the first two freedoms
of the air. The International Air Transport Agreement, called
the "Five Freedoms Agreement," provided all signatory states
the first two freedoms plus the commercial freedoms.'0 ° While
only twenty-six countries, including the United States and Great
Britain, signed the Two Freedoms Agreement initially,1"6 as of
2000, more than seventy countries had signed on. 10 7 The Five
Freedoms Agreement, on the other hand, was a complete fail-
ure. Only the United States and fifteen other scattered states
signed the agreement, with the United States withdrawing from
it in 1947.108
D. THE EMERGENCE OF THE BILATERAL MODEL-AIRSPACE
SOVEREIGNTY GivEs WAY To BILATERAL AGREEMENT
The Chicago Convention failed to establish a multi-lateral
framework for international air transportation and essentially
reaffirmed the absolute air sovereignty principle. As a result,
states turned to the bilateral agreement as a basis for future air
transportation development. The sheer number of states partic-
ipating in the Conference, divergent opinions, and the com-
plexities of the issues surrounding commercial freedoms gave
states no other choice. With rejection of the Five Freedoms
Agreement came the choice of either closing off airspace access
to other states completely or attempting to establish individual
requiring that specific permission be granted before allowing non-scheduled air
traffic the technical freedoms of the air that were clearly allowed under Article 5,
essentially applying Article 6 restrictions to all traffic. See Ruwantissa I.R.
Abeyratne, The Economic Relevance of the Chicago Convention-A Retrospective Study,
19 ANNALS OF AIR & SPACE L. 3, 15-16 (1994).
104 International Air Services Transit Agreement, Dec. 7, 1944, 59 Stat. 1693,
84 U.N.T.S. 389.
105 International Air Transport Agreement, Dec. 7, 1944, 59 Stat. 1701, 171
U.N.T.S. 387.
106 See WAGNER, supra note 2, at 140.
107 United Nations Decade of International Law (Report of the Secretary General), 39
I.L.M. 966, 970 (2000) [hereinafter United Nations].
108 JOHNSON, supra note 87, at 65. As of 2000, only 12 states remained parties
to the agreement. See United Nations, supra note 107, at 970.
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"five freedoms" style agreements with individual states through
the use of reciprocity. °9
The use of bilateral air rights agreements by the United States
was not unanticipated. Historical research shows that there was
a basic conflict within the United States Government prior to
the Chicago Conference. One group preferred the bilateral
mechanism and the leverage it gave the United States in negoti-
ations. The other, more idealistic group, which possibly in-
cluded President Roosevelt himself, was concerned with a much
more comprehensive approach to free trade by air in the post-
war world."' The United States had negotiated its first bilateral
air agreement with Colombia in 1929, so it was familiar with the
process following the Chicago Convention. 1 When viewed
from a sovereignty standpoint, these bilateral agreements served
as a limitation of airspace sovereignty for mutual benefit.
Great Britain, having failed in Chicago in their attempts to
establish an international body charged with the control of in-
ternational air traffic, and having refused to sign the Five Free-
doms Agreement, was faced with the choice of closing off its
airspace to international traffic or using the bilateral model.'12
In the end, state interests favored the bilateral agreement even
though the United States had the upper hand in such negotia-
tions because of its superior bargaining position (the sheer
number of cities it could offer to foreign airlines). Accordingly,
in 1946, Great Britain and the United States concluded the Ber-
muda I Agreement.' It served as the worldwide model for all
future bilateral agreements. 1 4 The Bermuda I Agreement was
relatively specific, detailing the fares, routes, capacities and fre-
quency levels of air transportation services between the two
countries. It clearly represented a compromise between the
-09 DIEDERIKS-VERSCHOOR, supra note 98, at 51.
"l0 William E. O'Connor, Present at the Creation: A Note on Some Historical Re-
search, 6 AIR L. 23, 25-26 (1981). O'Connor "winces" at the "grievously mislead-
ing oversimplification" of the U.S. liberal espousal of freedom of the skies at the
Chicago Convention. Id. at 23. He also notes that for the U.S. and U.K the Chi-
cago Convention was more an opportunity to work out a bilateral mechanism
between them, because the two states were the "most significant powers with re-
spect to the reestablishment of world airline service after the war." Id.
" I See id. at 24.
11 See WAGNER, supra note 2, at 147-48.
"1 Air Service Agreement, Feb. 11, 1946, U.S.-U.K.-N. Ir., 60 Stat. 1499, 3
U.N.T.S. 253 [hereinafter Bermuda I Agreement].
"4 JONSSON, supra note 71, at 34.
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freedoms of the air position of the United States and the con-
trolled development position of Great Britain.'
Today, the bilateral model is still the approach that most
states use regarding regulation of foreign air traffic. As of 1997,
there were approximately 1200 such agreements in place." 6 De-
spite the failure of the Chicago Conference to achieve a compre-
hensive freedom of the air regime, bilateral agreements are
based on commercial freedom of the air and thus are at least a
step towards overall freedom of airspace. 117
V. THE APPLICATION OF STATE SOVEREIGNTY OVER
AIRSPACE-THE CURRENT U.S. AIRSPACE
SOVEREIGNTY REGIME
The United States domestically implements the international
law of airspace sovereignty through a series of statutes and regu-
lations. It last codified its claim of exclusive sovereignty over its
airspace with passage of the Federal Aviation Act of 1958.18
This Act also created the Federal Aviation Administration
(FAA) "9 and gave the FAA regulatory power over United States'
airspace. 1 20
However, there are exceptions to the FAA's regulatory control
in certain cases involving issues of national security. For exam-
ple, military authorities may deviate from air traffic regulations
when "essential to the national defense because of a military
emergency or urgent military necessity."' 2 1 In wartime, the Pres-
ident may transfer any power of the FAA to the Secretary of De-
115 Salacuse, supra note 49, at 827.
116 See DIEDERIKS-VERSCHOOR, supra note 98, at 51.
117 These agreements have helped the U.S. maintain a robust airline industry.
Many European airlines have to be heavily subsidized in order to survive. It is
interesting to note, that some developing nation's air carriers are prepared to
compete with the U.S. on a more liberal basis than are many established Euro-
pean powers. Salacuse, supra note 49, at 837. The U.S. airline industry continues
to rapidly evolve and adapt nearly 25 years after the Airline Deregulation Act of
1978, Pub. L. No. 95-504, 92 Stat. 1705 (1978) (current version at 49 U.S.C.
§ 1301 (West 2002)).
118 See Federal Aviation Act of 1958, Pub. L. No. 85-726, §1108(a), 72 Stat. 749,
798 (1958) (codified as amended at 49 U.S.C.A. § 40103) (West 1997) (stating
"[t] he United States Government has exclusive sovereignty of the airspace of the
United States"). The U.S. had already asserted sovereignty over its airspace by
means of the Air Commerce Act of 1926, ch. 344, 44 Stat. 568 (1926).
19 Federal Aviation Act of 1958, supra note 118, at § 301(a).
120 Id. at § 307; 49 U.S.C.A. § 40103(b). The responsibilities of the FAA are
further delineated at 49 C.F.R. § 1.4(c) (2000).
121 Id. at § 40106(a).
138
AIRSPACE SOVEREIGNTY
fense by executive order.1 22 This is accomplished under the
provisions of the Security Control of Air Traffic and Air Naviga-
tion Aids (SCATANA) Plan.1 23 The Secretary of Transportation
must also take into account input from the armed forces with
regard to air traffic and allocation of airspace.1 24
Consistent with the limits of international law, the United
States has extended its territorial sea to 12 nautical miles from
the baselines of U.S. territory.1 25 Beyond its territorial sea, the
United States does not appear to have a solid legal basis for
claims of airspace sovereignty with the exception of control of its
contiguous zone "necessary to prevent and punish the infringe-
ment of its customs, fiscal, immigration, or sanitary laws and reg-
ulations."'126 Nonetheless, there is an extensive system of Air
Defense Identification Zones (ADIZ) whereby aircraft entering
a U.S ADIZ must make position reports to an appropriate air
traffic control facility at least 15 minutes before penetrating the
ADIZ.127 Aircraft intending to enter U.S. airspace must report
their positions when between one and two hours cruising time
from the United States. 128 In addition, aircraft in a U.S. ADIZ
must also comply with any "special security instructions issued by
the [FAA] in the interest of national security."'' 21
The mere requirement of identification of an aircraft in the
ADIZ might not be considered an exercise of state sovereignty.
However, requiring aircraft to comply with other rules, includ-
ing "special security instructions," is assuredly an extension of
jurisdiction, and thus state sovereignty, over such aircraft."'
122 Id. at § 40107(b). In addition, FAA assets and personnel may also be trans-
ferred. Id. In order to expedite the transfer of control of the FAA to the Depart-
ment of Defense, the President signed an executive order providing that the
Secretaries of Defense and Transportation develop plans for such transfer.
Under the Order, if deemed necessary by the Secretary of Defense, elements of
the FAA may be placed under direct operational control of an appropriate mili-
tary commander. During national emergencies short of war, the Secretary of
Transportation must ensure essential national security requirements. See Exec.
Order No. 11, 161, reprinted as amended in 49 U.S.C.A. § 40107 (West 1991).
123 32 C.F.R. § 245 (2001).
124 49 U.S.C.A. § 324(a)(1) (West 1997).
125 Proclamation No. 5928, 54 Fed. Reg. 777 (Dec 27, 1988).
126 Kay Hailbronner, Freedom of the Air and the Convention on the Law of the Sea, 77
AM.J. INT'L L. 490, 513-14 (1983).
127 14 C.F.R. §§ 99.17, 99.19 (2001). For the complete rules see Security Con-
trol of Air Traffic, 14 C.F.R. Pt. 99.
128 14 C.F.R. § 99.23.
129 Id. at § 99.7. Other requirements of Pt. 99 include filing a flight plan and
using an assigned transponder code.
130 Id.
2003] 139
JOURNAL OF AIR LAW AND COMMERCE
This practice has been justified on the basis of a contiguous
zone-like enforcement power, that is, sovereignty over airspace
lying above the contiguous zone should be the same as that over
the seas below or on the basis of necessity.'' Under these theo-
ries sovereignty of ADIZ airspace, both inside and outside of the
contiguous zone, is justified by the doctrines of self-preservation
and necessity. 3 2 Nonetheless, according to some commenta-
tors, there does not appear to be a basis in customary interna-
tional law for establishing ADIZs. 13:4 The practice merely
"pretends to be in accordance with international law as justified
by self-preservation or self-defence requirements ... [but] can-
not legally prevent foreign aircraft from enjoying freedom of air
navigation over the high seas."' 13 4
The more important issue is whether the United States has a
right to destroy a civil aircraft that ignores ADIZ requirements
and eventually enters U.S. airspace. It is difficult to imagine any
circumstance that would warrant the destruction of a foreign
aircraft in a U.S. ADIZ outside of U.S. national airspace.' 35
While use of force against military aircraft intentionally intrud-
ing into a state's airspace is probably settled through customary
international law,' 36 the permissibility of the use of force against
a civil airliner is far less clear. The Chicago Convention does
131 JOHN TAYLOR MURCHISON, THE CONTIGUOUS AIRSPACE ZONE IN INTERNA-
TIONAL LAW 52 (1956).
12 Id. at 58-66. Murchison argues that Article 51 of the United Nations Char-
ter authorizing individual or collective self-defense against an armed attack allows
for application of international law of self-preservation and necessity in the cre-
ations of ADIZs. Because the speed of aircraft is so great, the requirement that
there be "imminent danger" before a state resorts to self-defense "is no longer
necessary to the doctrine of necessity." Id. at 75.
133 Kay Hailbronner, The Legal Regime of the Airspace above the Exclusive Economic
Zone, 8 AIR L. 30, 42-43, (1983).
134 ZyLicz, supra note 84, at 61.
135 While it is difficult to imagine a circumstance that would warrant the de-
struction of a foreign aircraft in a U.S. ADIZ outside of U.S. national airspace, the
use of force against an aircraft carrying a known weapon of mass destruction may
be an exception under the doctrine of anticipatory self-defense.
136 Major John T. Phelps, Contemporary International Legal Issues-Aerial Intru-
sions By Civil And Military Aircraft In Time of Peace, 107 MIL. R. Rxv. 255, 292 (Win-
ter 1985). Even in cases where the intruding aircraft is military, the use of force
is not justified if the aircraft is in distress or the intrusion is unintentional. How-
ever, the threshold with regard to the use of force is much lower, except possibly
where the military aircraft is clearly a transport. Id. This is because military air-
craft are "state" aircraft for purposes of the Chicago Convention and thus ex-
cluded from the scope of the protections of the Convention. See Hailbronner,
Freedom of the Air, supra note 126, at 492; Chicago Convention, supra note 3, art.
3(a).
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not categorically prohibit the use of force against a civil aircraft.
Article 3(d) states that the contracting states "will have due re-
gard for the safety of navigation of civil aircraft."1 37 Annex 2 of
the Convention discusses the interception of aircraft and indi-
cates that intercepting aircraft should refrain from the use of
weapons in all cases of interception of civil aircraft. 13  Yet, de-
spite numerous incidents of civil airliners being shot down while
accidentally being in the territorial airspace of a state, none of
the offended states have claimed an "unqualified right to use
force against the intruding airliner."' 9 Thus, despite theoreti-
cal absolute sovereignty in national airspace, customary state
practice seemingly limits execution of that absolute right. Nev-
ertheless, growing concern over the issue, especially after the
Soviet shootdown of a Korean airliner in 1993, led ICAO to draft
an amendment to the Chicago Convention. 4 ° The amendment
essentially codified what states already generally considered to
be a recognized rule of customary international law, that every
state must refrain from resorting to weapons against civil aircraft
in flight. 4' The amendment was adopted unanimously by the
contracting states. 4 2 It came into force in 1998 but has not
been ratified by the United States. 4 3 The terrorist events of
September 11, 2001 will almost certainly have a significant im-
pact on whether the amendment will ever be ratified by the
United States.144
137 See Chicago Convention, supra note 3, art. 3(d).
138 INTERNATIONAL STANDARDS, RULES OF THE AIR, ANNEX 2 TO THE CONVENTION
ON INTERNATIONAL CIVIL AVIATION (ICAO 9th ed. 1990) (emphasis added).
139 William J. Hughes, Aerial Intrusions by Civil Airliners and the Use of Force, 45J.
AIR L. & COM. 595, 614 (Spring 1980). Bulgaria, Israel, China, and the Soviet
Union (on several occasions) have attacked civil aircraft that have violated their
airspace borders. See Phelps, supra note 136, at 293.
-4 ZYLIcz, supra note 84, at 69.
141 ICAO, Amendment of Convention on International Civil Aviation with Re-
gard to Interception of Civil Aircraft, ICAO Doc. 9437, A25-Res. (May 10, 1984),
at art. 3 bis § 3(a) (emphasis added), reprinted in 23 I.L.M. 705 (1984) ("every
state must refrain from resorting to the use of weapons against civil aircraft in
flight .... .") [hereinafter Article 3 bis]; see also Theodore Meron, Symposium: The
Hague Peace Conferences: The Martens Clause, Principles of Humanity, and Dictates of
Public Conscience, 94 AM. J. INT'L L. 78, 83 (2000).
142 Article 3 bis, supra note 141.
143 The Protocol to amend the Chicago Convention relating to Article 3 bis
entered into force on 1 Oct. 1998 after ratification of the required 102 states. As
of March 1999, 104 states had ratified the Protocol. United Nations, supra note
107, at 970.
144 How the U.S. applies this customary law in light of this new threat remains
to be seen. See discussion infra Part VIII.
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It is evident from U.S. law that the United States asserts abso-
lute sovereignty over its national airspace. Nonetheless, several
forces have been moving the United States and the rest of the
global community to change the traditionally held notions that
absolute airspace sovereignty is an unchanging international law
norm. These forces are challenging the way states define air-
space sovereignty in a world where traditional views about sover-
eignty are weakening.
VI. CURRENT FORCES FOR CHANGE IN
AIRSPACE SOVEREIGNTY
A. ECONOMICS AND AIRSPACE SOVEREIGNTY-THE GLOBAL AIR
ECONOMY
What has become clear in the last few decades is that the eco-
nomic aspects of airspace sovereignty have dominated change,
or the lack thereof, in the international air sovereignty regime.
Essentially, the laissez-faire proponents have continued to advo-
cate freedom of the air with unrestricted competition, while pro-
ponents of economic control have generally advocated absolute
airspace sovereignty as a tool of maintaining control and ensur-
ing survival of their national flagship carriers. Of course, na-
tional security concerns are always present, but the driving force
in the development of air sovereignty law has been decidedly
economic in nature.
For example, starting in 1976, the British government, per-
ceiving inequities in the Bermuda I Agreement, demanded that
a new bilateral air transportation agreement with the United
States be negotiated. 4 ' These inequities consisted of the diffi-
culty British air carriers were having because of the develop-
ment of high-capacity wide-bodied aircraft in the United States.
This created an over-capacity problem at the same time fuel
prices were escalating. The British carriers turned to the British
Government for help.' 46 Heated negotiations began and re-
sulted in the Bermuda II Agreement, 14 7 under which the United
States lost most Fifth freedom rights it previously had such as
the right to pick up traffic in Great Britain and take to other
European cities. The United States also agreed to express con-
trols on capacity. This agreement signified an even further de-
145 SeeJoNsSON, supra note 71, at 36.
146 See Salacuse, supra note 49, at 835.
147 Agreement Concerning Air Services, July 23, 1977, U.S.-U.K.-N. Ir., 28
U.S.T. 5367, T.I.A.S. 8641, as amended, Apr. 25, 1978, 32 U.S.T. 524, T.I.A.S. 8965.
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parture from the limited free enterprise position of Bermuda Iand towards an internationally regulated industry-somethingthat the British wanted all along.1 4' The British did not want anequal opportunity to compete with the United States but ratheran equal share of the benefits of the commercial aviation busi-ness between the two countries. In other words, the Britishwanted to gain a bigger share of the air-traffic by using its air-space sovereignty as a bargaining tool.Other attempts were made to economically control air trans-portation. ICAO unsuccessfully tried to assert itself into the airtransportation ratemaking process in the 1950s. 111 The Interna-tional Air Transport Association (IATA), a private organizationof scheduled airlines created in 1919,150 also began attemptingto economically regulate international air travel. This occurredprimarily because Bermuda I, and many other bilateral airagreements, contained IATA tariff setting clauses that were sub-ject to the approval of aviation authorities of the parties.151 Be-cause most of the world's airlines were also run by the variousstates, states had incentive to use their control over civil aviationpolicies to withdraw air traffic rights from other states.' 52 TheUnited States reacted to these attempts to limit the commercialfreedoms of the air by aggressively attempting to establish newagreements that would be much more free market oriented.151Thus began an aggressive movement towards broad agreementsto open up national airspaces to foreign commercial traffic.
B. TRANSITIONING TO AN ERA OF OPEN SKIES
In 1992, the United States announced a new "Open Skies"policy. ' The policy had eleven provisions designed to ease re-
148 Salacuse, supra note 49, at 836.
149 Zvlucz, supra note 84, at 87.
150 DIEERIKS-VERsCHOOR, supra note 98, at 43.
-51 Id. at 52.
152 SeeAbeyratne, supra note 103, at 17.
153 SeeJONSSON, supra note 71, at 36. Many of the these bilateral agreementsrelied to a greater extent on market forces in determining capacity, frequency,market entry, and pricing. The U.S. demanded that any of its carriers be allowedto enter and leave routes at will and unilaterally create low-fare pricing. In re-turn, the U.S. would open new gateway routes into the United States. The U.S.also threatened to divert present traffic to neighboring states if agreement was
not reached. Id.
1-54 In the Matter of Defining "Open Skies," Department of Transportation Or-der No. 92-8-13, 1992 DOT Av. LEXIS 586, 1 (Aug. 13, 1992), cited in Adam L.Schless, Open Skies: Loosening the Protectionist Grip on International Civil Aviation, 8EMORY INT'L L. REV. 435, 446 (1994).
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strictions on commercial aviation. 5 5 For freedom of the air pur-
poses, the relevant provisions included open entry on all routes
to and from the United States, unrestricted capacity and fre-
quency on all routes, and no restrictions as to intermediate
stops. 15' The United States signed the first Open Skies agree-
ment with the Netherlands in September 1992.157 As of 2000,
eight members of the European Union (EU) had entered into
Open Skies agreements with the United States.
1 58
As a result of the opening up of U.S. and various EU states'
skies, the European Commission formally protested, arguing
that Open Skies agreements with the United States by member
EU states were unfair because they "[took] away the possibility
for the EU carriers to compete on a fair and equal basis. ' 159 Its
reasoning was that states without Open Skies agreements with
the United States were seeing their air traffic siphoned off by
the EU states that had concluded Open Skies agreements with
the United States.1 60 The EU's concern was not the derogation
by member states of sovereignty over their respective airspaces,
but rather, the effects such derogation could have on the na-
tional air carriers of the more protectionist member states. The
EU's goal is creation of a common EU traffic market that can
compete against the United States. Thus, with the EU in control
of the bargaining process for all its member states, the EU states
would trade away their individual freedom to independently
enter into air transportation agreements with third countries as
they see fit.'61
In addition to the opening up of national airspaces through
the use of air traffic agreements such as Open Skies, other reali-
ties are forcing changes in the way states view absolute control
over their national airspaces. The booming growth in civil avia-
tion over the last several decades has led to innovative attempts
by states to solve their airspace capacity problems. In several
ways, these ideas will directly impact the ability of states to con-
trol their national airspaces.
155 Schless, supra note 154, at 447.
156 Id. at 447-50.
157 Agreement on Aviation Transport Services, Oct. 14, 1992, U.S.-Neth.,
T.I.A.S. 11976 (amending the Agreement of April 3, 1957, as amended, and the
Protocol of March 31, 1978, as amended); Schless, supra note 154, at 447.
158 Henri Wassenbergh, Common Market, Open Skies and Politics: A Bald Eagle's-
Eye View of Today's Air Transport Regulation, 25 AIR & SPACE L. 174, 175 (2000).
159 Id.
160 Id.
16i Id. at 178.
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C. FREE FLIGHT AND THE NATIONAL AIRSPACE SYSTEM
OPERATIONAL EVOLUTION PLAN
In June 2001, the Federal Aviation Administration released a
ten-year Operational Evolution Plan (OEP) to dramatically
change the way the United States controls its national airspace.
The purpose of the OEP is to respond to the increasing capacity-
demand imbalance within the U.S. National Airspace System
(NAS), as the present U.S. system simply cannot handle the vol-
ume of commercial traffic desiring to use it.16 2 With regard to
airspace control, the OEP envisions implementation of new
tools allowing pilots much greater freedom to navigate within
the NAS.' 63 Among these is a major initiative to implement the
"Free Flight" concept. Under this concept, pilots operating
under instrument flight rules (IFR) would no longer have to fly
pre-designed air routes between various preset points within the
United States. Instead, they would have the freedom to select
their path and speed in real time.' 64 The ability to implement
the system is dependant on a variety of new technologies, in-
cluding the use of the Global Positioning System (GPS). Some
of the technologies would allow aircraft to detect their location
and the location of other aircraft within certain distances. 6 5 As
a result, pilots would be free to use these technologies to avoid
other traffic and create the most efficient route to the respective
destination. Other technologies would allow the FAA to reduce
current traffic separation requirements and more accurately
predict upcoming areas of congestion. As a result, the FAA
could notify pilots so they could find their own routes to avoid
checkpoints.
162 See FAA, Operational Evolution Plan 3.0 (June 5, 2001), available at http://
www2.faa.gov/programs/oep [hereinafter OEP]. Version 3.0 the OEP was re-
placed after the events of Sept. 11 by version 4.0. The differences between the
two versions of the OEP are minimal. See infra note 202 and accompanying text.
163 See OEP, supra note 162, at 1. Under the OEP, the FAA designed a three-
phase approach to meet increasing demand. It identifies four capacity demand
problems that need to be solved: 1) arrival/departure rates; 2) airport weather
conditions; 3) en route severe weather; and 4) en route congestion. Multiple
solutions have been proposed to solve each of these major problems. These pro-
posed solutions include technology, infrastructure, and airspace control ideas.
Id. at 3-9.
64 Allison K. Lawter, Free Fight or Free Fall?, 62 J. AIR L. & COM. 915, 923
(1997). Under the Free Flight concept, the route and speed of the aircraft would
only be limited to ensure separation from other aircraft, avoid special use air-
space, and avoid overloading airport capacity. Id.
165 See id.
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The implementation of the Free Flight system would impact
state sovereignty in its airspace in several ways. First, the use of
electromagnetic signals, such as those generated using the GPS
system, necessarily entails the penetration of state airspace by
those signals. 6 6 Secondly, and more importantly, because Free
Flight gives control to the pilots to select the most advantageous
and economical route, a pure Free Flight system does not antici-
pate the necessity of getting clearances before entering the air-
space of another state. Thus, absent acquiescence by states to
allow commercial traffic to enter their respective airspaces
under the Free Flight system, changes to the Chicago Conven-
tion will be required. 67 Whether such changes would be fo-
cused on helping maintain the illusion of the Convention's
basic principal of absolute airspace sovereignty, or on funda-
mentally transforming the Chicago system, is difficult to predict.
Notwithstanding the implementation of such changes, under
the Free Flight system control over aircraft is transferred to the
pilots from ground controllers. In the United States, these con-
trollers work for the FAA and represent U.S. governmental
power over the aircraft. Because of their nature, commercial
aircraft represent the sovereign to which they belong. Under
Article 17 of the Chicago Convention, "an aircraft receives the
nationality of the state in which it is registered."' 68  Conse-
166 Bill Elder, Comment: Free Flight: The Future of Air Transportation Entering the
Twenty-First Century, 62J. AIR L. & COM. 871, 896-97 (1997). Elder, a former air-
line and naval pilot, argues that the use of GPS, although a definite intrusion into
the sovereign airspace of other states, has not met the same resistance as other
types of signals such as direct broadcasting signals (DBS). Intrusion into state
airspace by DBS was hotly contested in the United Nations as protesting states
feared the negative cultural influences that could result from DBS transmissions.
Since that time, intrusions with signals by other electromagnetic systems have met
with far less resistance because the value of the services offered offset objections
to possible negative cultural influences. Id.
167 Id. at 897-98.
168 See ZyLicz, supra note 84, at 67 (quoting Chicago Convention, supra note 3,
art. 17). The aircraft nationality relationship is sui generis, i.e. unique, in interna-
tional law. An aircraft's nationality helps determine the scope of the application
of rules where typical territorial or personal jurisdiction based criteria do not
work well. The development of flightcraft, commercial air traffic alliances, and
state registration of aircraft by non-citizens, are challenges to the present system.
They are often considered to be a hindrance to the growth of the international
air transportation system. Id. at 67-68. For example, with emerging technology,
flightcraft (aircraft having the ability to operate in the atmosphere and in space)
will have the ability to transition between the air and space during flights. This
would necessarily mean the aircraft would be subject to two diametrically op-
posed legal regimes-airspace sovereignty and freedom of outer space. Conse-
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quently, the handing over of navigational control of foreign air-
craft to the pilots of those aircraft under the Free Flight system
is arguably a derogation of state sovereignty over control of its
airspace-though the state takes such action willingly. Natu-
rally, the willingness of a state to transfer some of its airspace
sovereignty under such a system would be, in large part, due to
the reciprocal economic benefit it receives from its national car-
riers being able to take similar advantage of a Free Flight system
in other states. Nonetheless, even if other states do not imple-
ment Free Flight systems, the OEP's extensive discussion of Free
Flight tools makes clear that the U.S. march toward opening
U.S. airspace internally through the use of Free Flight is
inevitable.' 69
D. MERGING SOVEREIGNTY WITH THE SINGLE EUROPEAN SKV
By far the most remarkable example of a new way of looking
at absolute airspace sovereignty has been development of the
Single European Sky within the EU-a development consistent
with the EU's overall purpose. Since creation of the EU, the
absolute sovereignty principle of the Chicago Convention has
been an anathema to the EU's goals. Established by the Treaty
of Rome in 1957,170 the EU included as one of its objectives "the
abolition of obstacles to freedom of movement for persons, ser-
vices and capital, and the adoption of a common transport pol-
icy. These objectives necessarily involve some transfer of
sovereignty to the Community.' 171 Since that time, the EU has
slowly implemented a series of regulations designed to over-
come the protectionist nature of the European states with re-
gard to commercial aviation. The regulations were intended to
install more market-oriented principles and were largely imple-
mented by 1993.172 However, these changes have not been
quently, the same aircraft could be subject to the application of myriad rules as
between the two systems relating to issues such as jurisdiction.
169 See OEP, supra note 162, at 4-8; see also Bruce Nordwell, Free Flight Benefits
Anticipated As FAA Deploys Controller Aids, AVIATION WK. & SPACE TECH. (Nov. 2,
2001) (stating that the first phase of free flight will cost the FAA $600 million
through the end of 2002).
170 Treaty Establishing the European Economic Community, opened for signa-
ture Mar. 25, 1957, 298 U.N.T.S. 11 (entered into force Jan. 1, 1958).
171 Karl-Heinz Bockstiegel & Paul Michael Kramer, Filling in the Gaps of the Chi-
cago Convention: Main Features of the New Legal Framework For Aviation in the Euro-
pean Community, 19 ANNALS OF AIR & SPACE L. 127, 129 (1994).
172 See id. at 132. This approach contrasted markedly from the deregulation
approach taken in the United States following the Airline Deregulation Act of
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enough given the growth of economic globalization, which con-
tinues to decrease the importance of traditional notions of sov-
ereign borders. 17 3 It has also resulted in considerable debate
concerning the future of sovereignty over airspace with com-
mentators calling for consideration of a new way of looking at
state sovereignty.174 To do so is critical because "[no] effective
or efficient solution for the future will be found unless the no-
tion of sovereignty is reconsidered, and applied in a different
way."' 175 With implementation of its idea to create a single Euro-
pean Sky, the EU is doing just that.
In October 2001, the Commission of the European Commu-
nities (EC) announced proposals for a framework regulation
aimed at creating a single European sky by December 31,
2004.176 In announcing the proposals, the Commission Vice-
President with special responsibility for transport and energy
stated, "Europe's citizens will at last be able to fly in a European
Sky unhampered by frontiers while enjoying the highest possible
level of aviation safety. ' 177 The EC proposal aims for integration
of Air Navigation Services, interoperability of air traffic manage-
ment, and organization and use of airspace. 178 It will create a
European upper airspace zone "conceived as a single airspace
without frontiers [and] is created by merging the 15 regions
1978, Pub. L. No. 95-504, 92 Stat. 1705 (1978). "Europe needed more regulation
to phase out the traditional aviation structure where almost every market activity
had to be approved .. ." Bockstiegel & Kramer, supra note 171, at 132 (emphasis
supplied).
173 Francis P. Schubert, The Creation of the Single European Sky, 25 ANNALS OF AIR
& SPACE L. 239, 246 (2000). Schubert argues that state powers with regard to
security and national defense are "the core elements of sovereignty." Id. at 259.
Thus, while other traditional state powers may have been integrated into the
overall understanding of sovereignty, these can be separated out and delegated
to other states or multi-national organizations without infringing on core sover-
eignty. Accordingly, a new definition of sovereignty is not needed, "merely new
ways of exercising sovereign powers." Id. This type of argument is frequently
used to convince the defenders of sovereignty that none of a state's sovereign
powers are being lost while, at the same time, explaining how sovereign powers
are being performed by non-state actors.
174 Id. at 248.
175 Id. at 247.
176 Press Release, Commission of European Communities, A Single European
Sky In 2004-Towards a More Efficient and Safer Airspace (Oct. 10, 2001), avail-
able at http://www.europa.eu.int/comm/transport/air.
177 Id.
178 Communication from the Commission to the Council and the European




into a single portion of airspace." '179 Among the motivating
forces for moving to creation of the single European airspace is
the issue of aviation safety and security in the face of an ever-
increasing air traffic volume. The EC also used the terrorist at-
tacks in the United States on September 11, 2001 as further jus-
tification for the need to create a framework agreement:
[T] he attacks of 11 September in the United States have demon-
strated the need for better integration of security aspects in air
traffic management through better integration and harmoniza-
tion of procedures and technologies and better coordination be-
tween all stakeholders, including military ones. Implementing
the single sky will make it possible to prevent and manage crises
more effectively. 80
As can be seen, this proposal is a vivid example where the EU
states have "left the role which the Chicago Convention attrib-
uted to them and disclaimed their traditional sovereign rights to
influence the economic aspects of aviation. The European heri-
tage of the Chicago Convention has been gradually converted
into an integrated system based on multilateral principles." 181
Of course, the transition to the Single European Sky will not be
without logistical difficulties. The challenges posed in integrat-
ing operations in the national airspaces of the entire EU are
formidable given the number of national airspaces, as well as the
plethora of civilian and military users of those airspaces. None-
theless, the willpower of the EU to take on such a daunting task
is incontrovertible evidence that the absolute airspace sover-
eignty regime is crumbling in Europe. The EC clearly believes
that the advantages of change outweigh traditional considera-
tions of sovereignty.
179 Id. at 7. Efficiency rather than protection of European air traffic is the mo-
tivation towards elimination of national airspace boundaries within the European
Community. The Commission proposals are designed, among other things, to
complement previous implementation of the Flexible Use Airspace system. This
system operates on the principle that "airspace should no longer be designated as
either pure civil or military airspace, bur rather be considered as one continuum
in which all airspace users have to be accommodated to the extend possible." Id.
at 8 n. 11. Under Flexible Use Airspace, designations of airspace as either military
or civilian are temporary in nature.
i80 Unlike actions taken in the United States following September 11, 2001,
the EC opined that the terrorist attacks do "not diminish but rather reinforced
(sic) the need for a Single European Sky." Id. at 2. Actions by the United States
were in stark contrast. See discussion infra Part VII.
18, Bockstiegel, supra note 171, at 132-33.
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Along with Open Skies efforts and the FAA's OEP, the propo-
sal to create the Single European Sky demonstrates that factors
beyond state interests in maintaining complete sovereignty over
national airspace are slowly drawing states away from the Chi-
cago Convention's absolute sovereignty formula. In the past
these forces were primarily economic and will continue to be
the driving force for change. Nonetheless, given the growth in
air traffic, an underlying need for efficiency and air safety have
added to the momentum towards change-a change resulting
in the continuing erosion in the absolute airspace sovereignty
doctrine. Creating a Single European Sky is proof of that.
VII. SEPTEMBER 11TH-A TEMPORARY RETREAT TO
ABSOLUTE CONTROL
"Aviation security is now national security."182
Those words by the United States Federal Aviation Adminis-
trator summarized a dramatic change in U.S. focus regarding its
national airspace following the devastating air attacks on Sep-
tember 11, 2001. A "new era in commercial aviation" had be-
gun. I" Following the attacks, the FAA issued a series of airspace
restrictions under its emergency authority to make air traffic
rules. 84 Airspace within 18 nautical miles of Washington D.C.
was placed off-limits to most aircraft and substantial restrictions
were placed over use of airspace surrounding Boston and New
York."8 5 Washington's Ronald Reagan National Airport was
182 BAV: Garvey Vows to Continue Push to Open Airspace, THE WKLY. OF Bus. AVIA-
TION, Nov. 12, 2001, available at http://www.aviationnow.com.
t83 FAA Mourns Fallen, Prepares for New Era In Commercial Aviation, FAA INTER-
COM, Oct. 2001, at 6 [hereinafter FAA Mourns]. Several of the actions taken in
response to the Sept. 11 attacks are related to airspace control, but most of the
changes involve security programs at airports and onboard aircraft. As of Oct.
2001, $500 million was set-aside to implement safety improvements including air-
port access control, cockpit access, cameras for pilots to monitor passenger com-
partments, and automatic transponders that cannot be powered off. See id. at 7.
184 See 14 C.F.R. § 91.139 (2002). This regulation authorizes the FAA Adminis-
trator to make determinations that emergency conditions exist related to the
FAA's ability to conduct safe flight conditions. Rules made in response to the
emergency condition are communicated to aviators through the use of Notices to
Airman (NOTAMS).
185 See, e.g., FDC NOTAM 0989: !FDC 1/0989 Special Notice (Oct. 5, 2001)
(prohibiting all general aviation aircraft within 18nm of Washington National
Airport), available at http://www.nbaa.org/notamO98 9 .htm; FDC NOTAM 1/
2293: New York City TRFs (Nov. 9, 2001) (partially restricting airspace around
the New York metropolitan area), available at http://www.nbaa.org/
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closed.' 86 Notices were also issued warning that aircraft enter-
ing newly established or existing prohibited or restricted areas
were subject to being "forced down" and that the U.S. military
was authorized to use deadly force to protect the areas from un-
authorized incursion.8 7 To enforce this, U.S. fighter aircraft pa-
trolling U.S. airspace increased in number and were placed on
high alert.' 88
Also, new rules were placed on air traffic originating outside
the United States. For example, general aviation aircraft operat-
ing under visual flight rules' 8 were prohibited from entering
U.S. territorial airspace except under limited circumstances.' 9"
Air carriers from states other than Canada and Mexico, flying
larger aircraft, which required the carrier to have a security pro-
gram in place, were also restricted from entering U.S. airspace
except on a case-by-case basis."' The FAA, under its authority
for security control of aircraft, also implemented new rules,
under expedited procedures, for aircraft operating within a U.S.
ADIZ. 19 2
notam2293.htm. Restrictions around these areas were modified in Dec. 2001,
but essentially remain the same.
186 See FAA Mourns, supra note 183, at 6.
187 See FDC NOTAM 0609: Details Shoot Down Policy (Sept. 28, 2001), available
at http://-vvv.nbaa.org/notam0609.htm. The notice states that "deadly force
[will be used] only as a last resort, after all other means are exhausted." Id. Later
guidance reaffirmed U.S. policy and urged pilots to become familiar with military
intercept procedures. See H. Dean Chamberlain, National Security and Interception
Procedures, FAAvIATION NEWS (Jan./Feb. 2000), available at http://vw.faa.gov/
avr/afs/news/archive/janfeb2002/nsaip.htm. As previously suggested, the U.S.
terrorist attacks will likely have a profound effect on the future application of
international law regarding if and when civil aircraft may be shot down by a state.
See infra Part VIII.
188 William B. Scott, NORAD, Fighters on High Domestic Alert, AVIATION WK. &
SPACE TECH. (Oct. 1, 2001), available at http://wv.aviationnow.com/content/
publication/awst/2001 1001/aw37.htm.
189 Visual Flight Rules (VFR) refers to rules govern procedures for conducting
flight under visual conditions. VFR is also used in the United States to indicate
weather conditions that are equal to or greater than minimum VFR require-
ments. 14 C.F.R. § 170.3 (2001). VFR traffic is typically under less control of
ground controllers than IFR traffic. Almost all airline traffic operates under IFR.
190 See FDC NOTAM 1/3356 (Dec. 19, 2001), available at http://wvw.nbaa.
org/notam3356.htm.
191 Id.
192 Security Control of Traffic, 66 Fed. Reg. 49,818 (Sept. 28, 2001) (codified
at 14 C.F.R. pt. 99). The FAA used its authority to issue the new requirements as
a final rule with requests for comments, with an effective date Nov. 13, 2001. The
rule formally extended U.S. ADIZs out to the 12nm territorial limit pursuant to
Presidential Proclamation 5928 and created requirements for aircraft in U.S.
ADIZs to file and close flight plans and continuously monitor an assigned aero-
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As can be seen, the immediate action of the United States af-
ter September 11 was either more strict enforcement of existing
airspace control laws or creation of new rules, either of which
indicated a strong U.S. assertion of absolute airspace sovereignty
over U.S. territorial airspace. Security concerns overcame eco-
nomic freedom as the primary focus. The greatest concern has
clearly been airlines flying into U.S. airspace, given their heavy
weight and larger fuel loads. 193 Concerns naturally arise from
the evident destructive power of an airliner as compared to
smaller aircraft. However, concern over control of smaller air-
craft flying over U.S. territory is also evident. For example, all
aircraft are now prohibited from flying within several miles of
any major sporting event or other large public gathering and
have been warned not to loiter near sensitive areas such as nu-
clear power plants.'9 4 Naturally, the security of air operations
around Washington D.C., where many of the United States' sym-
bols of sovereignty lie, is of the highest priority. It is highly
likely these restrictions will continue until security onboard air-
craft flying into and over United States territory is dramatically
improved.
VIII. THE SECURITY QUESTION AFTER SEPTEMBER 11
The events of September 11 emphasized the immediate secur-
ity needs of states for protection from civil aircraft intended for
use as weapons. They also required a reevaluation of the rules
governing the use of force against aircraft flying in territorial
airspace. State security will certainly be a first priority in further
negotiations over airspace sovereignty issues, especially in the
United States, which felt the direct impact of the attacks. The
nautical facility frequency. See id. at 49,819. The notice does not mention the
attacks of Sept. 11 as a basis, rather, control of aircraft engaging in drug traffick-
ing is cited. Nonetheless, it is facially evident that the timing of the rule and the
use of expedited procedures were determined with the Sept. 11 attacks fresh in
the minds of the rule makers.
193 Several of the post-Sept 11 NOTAMS restrict air traffic operators operating
aircraft at a gross takeoff weight of more than 95,000 pounds unless they have an
existing security program. See, e.g., NOTAM FDC 1/3356, supra note 197.
194 See FDC NOTAM 1/3353 (Dec. 19, 2001) (prohibiting flights within 3nm of
a major sporting events or assembly of people), available at http://www.nbaa.
org/notam3353.htm; FDC NOTAM 1/3352 (Dec. 19, 2001), available at http://
www.nbaa.org/notam3352 (stating that "in the interest of national security, and
to the extent practicable, pilots are advised to avoid the airspace above, or in
proximity to, sites such as nuclear power plants, power plants, dams, refineries,
industrial complexes, and other similar facilities, pilot should not circle as to loi-
ter in the vicinity of such facilities).
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events of September 11 may also raise concerns involving the
safety of a state's civil aircraft and citizens while they are flying
over other states. There is real possibility that the September 11
attacks may have lowered the international law threshold for
shooting down a civil airliner, despite the prohibitive language
of Article 3 bis. 9 5 Some states may now be more inclined to risk
international wrath by shooting down another state's airliner if
it perceives a risk that the aircraft may become a weapon-a so-
called "shoot now, talk later" approach.
The future of Article 3 bis itself may be in doubt. Its "must
refrain" language may have to be amended to explicitly reflect a
state's use of force against a civil aircraft upon reasonable belief
that such aircraft will be used as a weapon against the state. A
more precise definition of "civil aircraft" also needs to be cre-
ated to take into account the use of a non-state aircraft being
used by terrorists as a weapon, with or without innocent civilians
on board.196 The language in Article 3 bis preserving the rights
of states to self-defense under the United Nations Charter may
prove to be overly ambiguous given the negative world attention
typically focused on the use of force against an airliner with in-
nocent civilians aboard. 97 Nonetheless, it is clear that the
United States is ready to use force against a civil airliner sus-
pected of being used as a weapon regardless of whether civilians
are on board. 9 8 In light of the way airliners were used as weap-
ons on September 11, further movement towards open airspace
will heavily depend on the ability of states to create a secure avia-
tion system and have confidence that this security problem has
been solved.
Nonetheless, despite the steep rise in concern over airspace
security in the United States, other U.S. actions since September
11 suggest that the same steps that were resulting in a slow
195 See Article 3 bis, supra note 141, at § 3(a).
196 See ZvLicz, supra note 84, at 70. Zylicz presciently recognized that a civil
aircraft could be used as an instrument of a terrorist attack, but only foresaw the
possibility that such an aircraft would not be carrying innocent civilians. If the
legal authority to shoot down a civil aircraft carrying terrorists is uncertain, the
legal authority to shoot down one containing terrorists and innocent civilians is
more unclear. The events of September 11 emphasized this uncertainty.
197 Art. 3 bis, supra note 141, at § 3(a). The Article states that the prohibition
on the use of force against a civil aircraft in flight "shall not be interpreted as
modifying in any way the rights and obligations of states set forth in the Charter
of the United Nations." This would, of course, include the rights of self-defense
under Article 51 of the U.N. Charter. U.N. Charter art. 51.
198 See FDC NOTAM 1/0609, supra note 187.
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march towards opening airspace prior to September 11 have not
been deterred by those terrible events. Immediate work began
on a plan to reopen Reagan National Airport for commercial air
traffic in Washington D.C.'99 Blanket waivers of emergency
rules restricting foreign aircraft from crossing U.S. borders wereissued for all U.S., Canadian, Mexican, and Bahamian aircraft.200
A major meeting intended to discuss implementation of Free
Flight systems was held in December 2001.21I Even more telling
was the FAA's re-issuance of a revised Operational EvolutionPlan.2 °2 While the OEP mentions the attacks of September 11, it
is essentially the same document issued in June 2001.
Obviously, the reaction to the September 11 tragedy demon-
strated that security issues lie at the heart of future changes in
airspace sovereignty doctrine. What is interesting is that the Eu-
ropean and U.S. approaches will continue to be different. TheEU used the September 11 attacks to push even harder for theSingle European Airspace, which would result in significantly re-
duced airspace sovereignty with an attendant ability to increase
airspace security under the system.20 3 Under the U.S. approach,
19 See A Regional Airspace Security Response to the Air Terrorism Threat to Our Na-
tion's Capital, Report of the Ad Hoc Committee (Working Document), Sept. 26,2001, available at http://www.bracepatt.com in the Publications & Speeches
archive. The Ad Hoc Committee strenuously argued that National Airport
should reopen, albeit with newly designed procedures that would be the interna-
tional "gold standard" by which airport security is judged, and planes operatinginto and out of the airport "should set the benchmark for in-flight security." Id.
at 10. These measures would be aimed at making it one of the most tightly con-
trolled airport terminal areas in the world. With regard to aircraft operations
other than commercial airlines, extensive efforts were being made to allow such
operations at National Airport by March 2002. The proposed plan would have
these aircraft operators apply and agree to comply with FAA issues security letters
of authorization (SLOAs). The SLOAs "would verify the identity of crew andpassengers and also outline specific operational practices." Angela Kim, NBAAUnveils Plan To Reopen National Airport, WKLY. OF Bus. AVIATION, Jan. 14, 2002,
available at http://www.aviationnow.com.
200 Garvey Vows to Continue to Push Open Airspace, WKLY. OF Bus. AVIATION, Nov.
12, 2001, at 1, available at www.aviationnow.com.
20, Notice of RTCA Government/Industry Fee Flight Steering Committee
Meeting, 66 Fed. Reg. 59044 (Nov. 26, 2001).
202 A more recent revision, version 4.0, essentially maintains the FAA's move to
revamping the U.S. national airspace system, including the implementation ofFree Flight. See OEP, Version 4.0, available at http://www.faa.gov/programs/
oep/OEP4.0/Director.htm (last visited Jan. 25, 2003). In February 2002, the Di-
rector's Message on the first page of the OEP emphasizes having the faith and
courage to "stick with the plan." Id. (emphasis supplied). This language disap-
peared in later versions of the Directors Message.
203 See supra note 180 and accompanying text.
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the opposite is true. Sovereignty will be strongly asserted over
U.S. airspace at least until aircraft security can be adequately
controlled. This is partly due to geography. The U.S. airspace
system is much larger than any individual European states' air-
space. Thus, the mere volume of airspace and lack of proximity
to other states except Mexico and Canada, reduce the need for
cross-state cooperation regarding airspace control. Accordingly,
the U.S. approach to control of airspace will continue to lie in
the FAA's OEP and its focus on airspace use efficiency, includ-
ing implementation of the Free Flight model,2 " as well as con-
tinuing U.S. negotiations on Open Skies agreements.215 The
pressure to continue a slow march away from the absolute air
sovereignty model will persist in the United States and Europe,
in different ways-with each way largely consistent with U.S. and
EU views concerning the exercise of sovereignty generally. On
the other hand, movement away from absolute airspace sover-
eignty by much of the rest of the world will lag behind due to
political realities and a lack of economic benefit.
IX. GLOBALISM AND THE AIRSPACE
SOVEREIGNTY DICHOTOMY
Despite the transforming events of September 11, there con-
tinues to be pressure on states to alter their perceptions of state
sovereignty over airspace. On a greater scale, calls for states to
alter the way that sovereignty itself is viewed are common.20 6
Nonetheless, unlike many other areas where the rise of plura-
lateralism is becoming normative in an increasingly globalistic
world, rapid transformation in views of airspace sovereignty have
not occurred. Rather, the movement away from traditional no-
tions has been halting and deliberate. It would be foolish to
argue that the forces for change in this area are producing a sea
of change in airspace sovereignty doctrine. Nonetheless, the
EU, and to a lesser extent the United States, are heading slowly
and deliberately down a path towards more open skies using dif-
ferent approaches. In contrast, much of the rest of the world
clings to the absolute sovereignty model. One reason for this is
204 See discussion supra Part VI.C.
205 See discussion supra Part V.I.B.
206 See, e.g., Daniel C. Thomas, International NGOs, state Sovereignty, and Demo-
cratic Values, 2 CHI. J. INT'L L. 389 (2001) (arguing that NGOs are increasingly
effective in placing conditions on the exercise of state sovereignty). Examples
include the World Trade Organization and the General Agreement on Tariffs
and Trade, commonly called "GATT."
2003] 155
JOURNAL OF AIR LAW AND COMMERCE
that economic forces for change in the burgeoning interna-
tional air transportation market have run into barriers that do
not stand in the way of other international enterprises.2"7 First
among these are the seemingly attractive attributes that accom-
pany claims of airspace sovereignty, especially the economic lev-
erage that airspace sovereignty provides to states.
As a result, wholesale movement towards a worldwide agree-
ment on the free movement of air traffic is unrealistic. A num-
ber of forces are working against any such agreement. The
demise of colonialism and the failure of numerous communist
and neo-fascist states, led to the emergence of many small states.
Each seeks international recognition and respect as an equal
among states. Asserting maximum sovereign rights is one way to
achieve those goals. 2 8 With economic power spread more
evenly, new centers of power are emerging, each with its own
individual interests. The traditions, cultures, and ideologies of
these many new states have "vastly complicated the process of
reaching agreement on international legal principles in general
and international air law in particular. ' 20 9 A case in point is that
for most states, the national airline, like a navy, gives the state
the ability to assert its presence on the world scene as a direct
arm of the government.21 0 These states, therefore, have a vested
interest in retaining total sovereignty over their airspaces in or-
der to ensure the survival of their national flagship carriers.
However, it is more than nationalism that is keeping most
states in the absolute airspace sovereignty camp. Once again,
economic realities have proved to be a substantial force. As a
symbol of the state, states are loath to have their national flag-
ship carriers fail. They must survive even if substantial subsi-
dizing of the carrier is necessary. Opening up sovereign
207 For example, unlike the airline transport industry, various other industries
such as automobile manufacturers, energy companies, and hotel businesses set
up multi-national companies that set their own price levels and take whatever
actions seem desirable wherever opportunity exists. See Bockstiegel & Kramer,
supra note 171, at 128.
208 See Salacuse, supra note 49, at 834. Salacuse asserts that economic realities
in most states are greatly hindering the ability to reach a new worldwide agree-
ment on air law. The economic forces of free enterprise that move the wealthy
states to seek to open airspace are viewed with suspicion-as a way to "merely
allow the rich nations to become richer at the expense of the poor." Id. This is a
general view of many Third World jurists who view their lack of economic power
when compared to the Western economic powers as a form of neo-colonialism.
See Makau Mutua, What is TWAIL?, 94 AM. Soc'Y INT'L L. PROC. 35 (1994).
209 Salacuse, supra note 49, at 833-34.
210 Bockstiegel & Kramer, supra note 171, at 128.
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airspace could drive these subsidization costs way up and
threaten the survival of the national airline, which could occur
as a result of a "full blast of market pressures. ' 21' Trading air-
space rights gives such states the power to use their economic
leverage against the large air transportation powers, thereby
keeping competition from more efficient airlines at bay. Thus,
the primary force preventing change is not who owns the air but
rather, who owns the air traffic. 2 12
It is evident that economics more than any other factor is the
dichotomous force that, at once, drives some states away from
the absolute airspace sovereignty model and others towards it.
The interests of smaller states in world recognition and assertion
of their economic rights are opposed to interests in open skies
and free competition. Accordingly, economic aspects of air-
space sovereignty are likely to dominate any future changes in
the international air sovereignty regime so long as security con-
cerns are satisfied. Laissez-faire proponents will continue advo-
cating freedom of the air and unrestricted competition.
Proponents of economic control will advocate either absolute
airspace sovereignty or, as in the case of the EU, the pooling of
sovereignty, as a tool to ensure survival of their national flagship
airlines and their ability to compete in the global air transporta-
tion market. Economic advantage is driving both.
X. THE AIRSPACE SOVEREIGNTY DEBATE
Changes in airspace sovereignty are happening. It is occur-
ring in different ways in the different states. Yet, there is sub-
stantial argument concerning whether these changes are really
affecting the principle of absolute airspace sovereignty. One
commentator asserts that "[t]ransformation of sovereignty in
the air is not really occurring ... [W] hat seems to be happening
is an evolution in the exercise of national sovereignty. '213 An-
other argues that the role of the sovereign is to provide security.
Thus, if strengthening international law strengthens security,
then the sovereign should delegate sovereign functions to an
international body in order to do so.214
211 Id. at 128-29.
212 See Salacuse, supra note 49, at 836.
213 Peter Haanappel, The Transformation of Sovereignty in the Air, 20 AIR & SPACE
L. 311, 317 (1995).
214 Ronald A. Brand, The Role of International Law in the Twenty-First Centuiy:
External Sovereignty and International Law, 18 FORDHAM INT'L L.J. 1685, 1696
(1995).
2003] 157
JOURNAL OF AIR LAW AND COMMERCE
Though attractive on their face, one weakness in these argu-
ments lies in taking them to the extreme. For if the delegation
of sovereignty to others is merely an exercise of absolute sover-
eignty, then that sovereign's decision to delegate its entire sover-
eignty, that is, its very existence as a sovereign entity, is the
logical end. It ultimately destroys itself by delegating away its
sovereign functions. That such a result could occur in the face
of the sovereignty absolutist's focus on survival of the state is
difficult to reconcile. The same end result occurs if the sover-
eign simply abrogates its sovereignty. Thus, the two approaches
are theories to the same end. The real issue is the political real-
ity of whether sovereignty once delegated can realistically be re-
trieved at an acceptable cost to the state. If it cannot for
whatever reason, then that portion of sovereignty has, for pur-
poses other than pure argument, been given away. This more
realistic approach is acknowledged by those who recognize the
following:
[T]he Chicago Convention's complete and exclusive sovereignty
can be overcome to the benefit of all players. The European sys-
tem, where functions and competence flowing from interna-
tional law are transferred from member states to an international
body, has proved to be able to move away from the stumbling
blocks of national sovereignty, the links between national pres-
tige and flag carriers and most of the absurdities in seeking a quid
pro quo through bilaterally negotiating and renegotiating traffic
rights .... [T]he historical mindset of aviation regulators must
not necessarily be locked into the ramifications of Article 1 of the
Chicago Convention. 2 15
On closer look, many of the proponents of the argument that
"sovereignty delegated is not sovereignty lost" seem more inter-
ested in appeasing those who cling to the traditional notions of
state sovereignty, than in acknowledging the political realities of
the transformation of sovereignty. 216 Nonetheless, these reali-
215 Bockstiegel & Kramer, supra note 171, at 138-39.
216 See, e.g., Schubert, supra note 173, at 258. Schubert attempts to rebut the
argument that renouncing a sovereign prerogative infringes on a state's sover-
eignty. He states that airspace sovereignty should simply be viewed from a differ-
ent perspective. See id. at 247. Another author asserts that the delegation of
sovereign functions to an international organization is not a release of sover-
eignty because the delegation does not have to be in perpetuity. Thus, even
though it could be economically costly, the ability of a state to retrieve these
sovereign functions means that sovereignty is not lost. See INGRID DETTER, THE
INTERNATIONAL LEGAL ORDER 484-85 (1994). While the pure ability to "retrieve"
sovereignty may exist, the idea fails to take in the societal cost of actually retriev-
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ties must be acknowledged because evidence of a slow evolution
in airspace sovereignty cannot be explained away as mere varia-
tions on absolute airspace sovereignty.
XI. CONCLUSION
To a certain degree, discussions about freedom of the air and
airspace sovereignty are theoretical and a solution to the prob-
lem seems unsolvable. It is a complex problem that will remain
as long as states persist in maintaining the fictions of the classi-
cal absolute airspace sovereignty doctrine. Nonetheless, contin-
ued evolution in international airspace law is an ideal area to
lead states to depend less on the absolute sovereignty concepts
and more on the promotion of peaceful economic relations. It
is evident that many of the leading states of the world are head-
ing in just that direction.
For most of the last several centuries the state sovereignty con-
cept has flourished and seemingly had no limit in its reach ex-
cept by technological limitations and the countervailing powers
of other states. Advancing technology gave states the ability to
extend their sovereignties much further than previously possible
through claims of sovereignty in supra-adjacent airspace. Most
attempts at limiting sovereignty through the use of international
agreements in the newly usable medium of airspace proved un-
successful. Many states had legitimate security concerns. Even
more importantly, holding onto the economic advantages of
maintaining airspace sovereignty was important with the under-
standable perceptions that commercial freedoms of the air
would only benefit the world's air powers.
As one of the territorial aspects of sovereignty, control over
territorial airspace will continue in many states until the eco-
nomic benefit of evolving to a different system is apparent.
Once this happens, movement away from the absolute sover-
eignty model will continue in proportion to the ability of the
states to implement aviation security systems. It will continue to
be a slowly evolving process with airspace economics on one side
of the scale and the aviation security on the other. The problem
of creating international norms of aviation security agreeable to
all states will prevent wholesale evolution away from absolute air-
ing them. If the cost is excessive, in terms of money or even through the use of
military power, the state may not be willing to pay the price. If it is not, then the
political reality is that the sovereignty has been lost for all practical purposes,
despite the existence of any pure right of retrieval.
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space sovereignty. This will continue for most states until the
economic benefits of free and open airspace outweighs the ben-
efits of asserting absolute airspace sovereignty. Once that oc-
curs, many states will be readily willing to implement aviation
security rules that will give other states the comfort needed to
continue moving towards new concepts of airspace sovereignty.
Many barriers obviously remain. However, in states where eco-
nomic pressures to change have been greatest, namely the EU
and the United States, derogation of airspace sovereignty has
occurred, though it is manifesting itself in different ways. The
solution devised by the EU clearly demonstrates that aviation se-
curity and state sovereignty over airspace are separable. This
will prove very difficult to overcome in the United States after
September 11. Nevertheless, if security concerns can be ad-
dressed, the economic benefit of moving further away from the
prescriptions of absolute airspace sovereignty will drive further
change, albeit slowly. Despite problems, the development of the
airspace law has proved a promising prospect in redefining the
traditional ways states view sovereignty. What happens next re-
mains to be seen, but whatever it is, airspace law will continue to
be a pivotal feature in the continuing development of interna-
tional law.
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